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Modeling and Formalism in Takings Jurisprudence
Thomas Ross*
The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
vides that the government shall not take private property without
paying just compensation.' During the twentieth century, the
United States Supreme Court has decided a series of cases address-
ing the issue of whether a particular governmental action consti-
tutes a "taking" of private property for which compensation must
be paid.2 The Court's takings jurisprudence is an especially unruly
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh; B.A., 1971, J.D., 1974, Univer-
sity of Virginia. I am indebted to Professors Richard 0. Brooks,James G. Durham, Cyril A.
Fox, Jr., Lawrence A. Frolik, Arthur D. Hellman, Dennis R. Honabach, W. Leslie Peat, and
Norman Williams, Jr. for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of the article. Paul
Boynton, Class of 1987 at the University of Pittsburgh Law School, provided able research
assistance. I also acknowledge the financial support from the University of Pittsburgh
School of Law Dean's Scholarship Fund.
1 "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CONST. amend V. The principle is also part of state constitutional law. See 3 P. NICH-
OLS, NICHOLS' LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.1(2) (J. Sackman rev. 3d ed. 1985) (citations to
state law analogs of fifth amendment principle).
2 See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984) (Environmental Pro-
tection Agency disclosure of trade secrets held a taking); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhat-
tan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (statute which permitted installations of cable
television equipment on apartment buildings held a taking of landlord's property); Texaco,
Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982) (statute which extinguished mineral rights after a period
of nonexploitation is not a taking); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981) (federal statute
regulating strip mining is not a taking); PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74
(1980) (requiring shopping center owner to accommodate persons seeking signatures on
petitions is not a taking); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (requiring
public access to marina, part of the "navigable waters" of the U.S., held a taking); Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) ("historical landmark"
designation and consequent restriction on development of airspace above Grand Central
Station is not a taking); Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (airplanes taking
off and landing near home located at end of runway held a taking); Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (governmental action which rendered materialmen's liens worth-
less held a taking); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (airplane overflight held a
taking); United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945) (government
projects which diminished the water power on navigable stream is not a taking); Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (statute which prohibited the mining of
coal so as to cause surface subsidence would not be constitutionally sanctioned in the ab-
sence of compensation); Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S.
327 (1922) (firing guns across land may be a taking); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921)
(rent control laws not a taking); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917) (government
projects which diminished water power on nonnavigable stream held a taking); Richards v.
Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914) (compensation need not be paid to the
owner of property near railroad tunnel for damage resulting from smoke, cinders, gases,
dust, dirt, and vibration incident to prudent operation of railroad); Lewis Blue Point Oyster
Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913) (dredging of a deep water channel which
destroyed cultivated oyster bed is not a taking); Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States,
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corner of constitutional law. The cases exhibit an apparent incon-
sistency,3 as general principles are gutted by exceptions.4 Further-
more, the Court itself confesses to relying on ad hoc solutions. 5
A particular sort of scholarly effort has evolved which is aimed
at imposing order and coherence on our takings jurisprudence: use
of the "decisional model" for the takings issue. The catalyst for
this work was John Costonis's article, "Presumptive and Per Se Tak-
ings: A Decisional Model for the Takings Issue."6 Professor Cos-
tonis creates a four-step series of questions which he envisions
would form the actual decisionmaking framework for the Justices in
the takings cases. He asserts that this decisional model can provide
216 U.S. 177 (1910), (requiring alterations to a bridge over an interstate waterway is not a
taking); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903) (navigation project rendering a valua-
ble rice plantation an "irreclaimable and valueless bog" held a taking).
3 "Few legal problems have proved as resistant to analytical efforts as that posed by
the Constitution's requirement that private property not be taken for public use without
payment ofjust compensation." Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE LJ.
149 (1971).
Two apparently anomalous cases are Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York,
438 U.S. 104 (1978) and Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982). In Penn Central the Court held that New York City, pursuant to a landmarks preser-
vation law, could deny the owners of Grand Central Station the right to lease the air space
above the station for the construction of an office tower. 438 U.S. at 138. The property
owners' loss was in the tens of millions of dollars. Four years later in Loretto, the Court
denied New York City the right to permit a cable television company to install cables and
boxes on the roof of an apartment building. 458 U.S. at 441-42. Although the equipment
facilitated the delivery of cable television to the tenants, only occupied at most one and one
half cubic feet of space and caused only a miminal diminution, if any, in market value, the
Court held this governmental action a taking of private property. Id. at 437-38. The denial
of development rights in Penn Central was, for the Court, merely a regulation of property
rights.
Obviously, the cases are more complex than these descriptions convey. Nonetheless,
the cases, at first look, exhibit an inconsistency which attracts the legal scholar who seeks to
impose order on the legal universe. See notes 196-99 infra and accompanying text.
4 For example, the federal government may assert control over the navigable waters of
the United States. This power is often called the "navigation servitude." The hornbook
rule is that losses resulting from the government's imposition of the navigation servitude
are not compensable "takings." The reality of the navigation servitude cases is more com-
plex. For a discussion of the hornbook rule and the navigation servitude cases, see note 87
infra and accompanying text.
5 "[The Court] has examined the 'taking' question by engaging in essentially ad hoc,
factual inquiries that have identified several factors-such as the economic impact of the
regulation, its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the char-
acter of the governmental action-that have particular significance." Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979). "Indeed, we have frequently observed that whether a
particular restriction will be rendered invalid by the government's failure to pay for any
losses proximately caused by it depends largely 'upon the particular circumstances [in that]
case.'" Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (quoting
United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958)).
6 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 465 (1983). Much of what will follow is critical of the Costonis
article. The criticisms, however, are related to the basic assumptions and premises of the
article and not to the execution.
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the coherence now apparently absent in the Court's takings
jurisprudence.
This article advances essentially two points. First, a decisional
model, Costonis's or any other, is unlikely to reflect the Justices'
actual decisionmaking processes in the takings cases. The essential
premise of any decisional model is that each of the nine justices will
reach a decision in the takings cases within, and wholly within, a
precisely drawn and mutually shared decisional framework. This
premise is demonstrably untenable. Second, the concept of these
types of decisional models, as well as the manner in which this par-
ticular model is offered, exemplify a formalistic sense of constitu-
tional interpretation. "Formalism," as used here, is essentially the
idea that solutions to the takings issue can somehow be value-neu-
tral. 7 The creator of the decisional model will likely cast his solu-
tion as value-neutral. Yet the creator will inevitably make value
choices a part of the creation process.
The error of this particular sort of formalism is in supposing
(or pretending) that a solution to the takings issue can be found
outside one's substantive value framework. The costs of that error
are in the way formalism can permit us to pretend that the hard
value choices made in the takings cases are somehow not really
value choices at all, a delusion which can stifle important reflection
and debate about those choices.
Part I of the article will explain the nature of the decisional
model using Costonis's offering as an example. Part II will argue
that decisional models fail as descriptive theory. Finally, Part III
will deal with modeling as formalism.
I. A Model
A. Stochastic and Deterministic Models
A "model" is a set of questions or principles which the creator
asserts are, or ought to be, used by the Court in deciding takings
cases. Creators may differ, however, in the expectations they have
for their models. Their expectations may lead them to create either
stochastic or deterministic decisional models.8
7 See notes 173-74 infra and accompanying text.
8 An analogous use of the terms "stochastic" and "deterministic" can be found in
econometrics. An econometric model is essentially a set of assumptions and hypotheses
about a particular state of affairs. For example, a model might contain assumptions relating
to various features of the labor market and the hypothesis that the minimum wage law
causes a higher level of unemployment than would occur without the law, all other things
being equal. The model might be tested by empirical studies, but the econometric model is
not, however, a picture of reality whose accuracy can be proven by empirical verification.
The econometrician assumes that reality cannot be modeled exactly. One of the bases for
this assumption is the idea of human indeterminacy, the notion of the inherent randomness
[Vol. 61:372
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"Stochastic" is an adjective meaning "involving a random vari-
able."9 A decisional model for the takings issue is stochastic if it
assumes the existence of a random variable attributable to the in-
herent indeterminacy in human decisionmaking A stochastic
model would set forth the questions or principles which are, or
ought to be, part of the decisionmaking framework for each of the
Justices without presuming to delimit precisely the actual decision-
making framework of each of the Justices. This modeler assumes
that an element of indeterminacy exists which makes the model al-
ways something short of a complete, actual picture of the decision-
making process in each and every takings case. In any particular
case, a Justice might see something that affects the decision yet is
outside the model. 10
The contemporary Court's stated framework for deciding tak-
ings cases is a stochastic model. The Court has expressed a set of
principles for deciding its takings cases, but has also carefully
staked out the element of indeterminacy.
[N]o "set formula" exist[s] to determine, in all cases, whether
compensation is constitutionally due for a government restric-
tion of property. Ordinarily, the Court must engage in "essen-
tially ad hoc, factual inquiries." But the inquiry is not
standardless. The economic impact of the regulation, especially
the degree of interference with investment-backed expectations,
in human behavior. In this sense the econometric model is stochastic and not determinis-
tic. See P. KENNEDY, A GUIDE To ECONOMERmICS 1-8 (1979).
Professor Tribe employs the term "model" in L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITIONAL
LAW (1978). His expectations for his seven "models" of constitutional law are quite differ-
ent from the expectations of the creator of a deterministic decisional model.
Representing approximate tendencies, emphases, and approaches rather than pre-
cise formal systems, these models are by no means mutually exclusive; constitu-
tional discourse in any given period can thus be expected to draw on ideas and
categories characteristic of more than one model. The models reflect neither en-
tirely self-conscious patterns of thought nor wholly unconscious explanatory struc-
tures; they combine elements at both levels of awareness. Their main purpose, as
will emerge, is heuristic; I believe they can enlarge understanding.
Id. at 1. The usefulness of such "models" is not challenged in this article.
9 WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1144 (1973).
10 It is often difficult to determine the expectations of the modeler. In Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundation of '"ust Compensation'" Law, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967), the author identifies the values of utilitarianism and fairness
which he asserts ought to be the foundation of takings jurisprudence. Moreover, he ex-
presses those values in a set of principles which could be thought of as a model. Michelman
does not, however, go on to assert that judges will simply decide cases pursuant to the
model. Michelman sees the process of deciding takings cases by reference to the values of
utilitarianism and fairness as an extremely complex and indeterminate process. Thus,
Michelman's model appears stochastic in nature. See id. at 1248-52. Costonis criticizes
Michelman's work as "abstract" and "ambiguous." Costonis, supra note 6, at 527 n.245.
More recently, Professor Epstein has proposed a model "to lend intellectual coherence to
the current body of eminent domain law." Epstein, Not Deference, But Doctrine: The Eminent
Domain Clause, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 351, 380. See also R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
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is of particular significance. "So, too, is the character of the
governmental action. A 'taking' may more readily be found
when the interference with property can be characterized as a
physical invasion by government, than when interference arises
from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens
of economic life to promote the common good."' 1
This insistence on the "ad hoc" nature of the inquiry reflects the
element of indeterminacy. In any particular takings case a factual
feature not accounted for by the general principles may influence
the Justices.
A deterministic model for the takings issue purports to reflect
in a whole and accurate way the decisionmaking process of the
Court. Justices would decide takings cases solely by reference to
the questions contained in the model. They would ignore the fea-
tures of any particular case which fell outside the perimeters of the
model, for the deterministic modeler believes that the model ac-
counts for all relevant variables.
The deterministic model, however, does not assure a predic-
tion of the outcome in particular cases. The questions of the model
will "determine" the outcome of a case in the sense that the mod-
eler presumes the Justices use only those questions to decide the
case. The nature of the questions might allow different Justices to
reach different answers.
Professor Costonis offers a deterministic model for the takings
issue. Costonis's ambition is to substitute his deterministic model
for the Court's proclaimed stochastic model, thereby providing the
coherence now lacking in takings jurisprudence. 12 One of the basic
theses of this article is that Costonis will surely fail in his ambition
because any deterministic model for the takings issue will fail to
reflect the actual decisionmaking process of the Justices.1
3
B. Costonis's Model
The Costonis model has four elements, the first being the
statement of a presumption: "A governmental incursion, physical
or regulatory, under which property is taken is a presumptive, not
11 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
12 Professor Costonis makes both the positive and normative claims. He claims the
model is both "a principled, coherent predicate for judicial management of compensation
practice under the takings clause" and "reasonably descriptive of the [Court's] general di-
rection." Costonis, supra note 6, at 469.
13 This article attacks the deterministic, not stochastic, decisional model for the takings
issue. Stochastic models which acknowledge both the inherent indeterminancy of human
decisionmaking and the inevitable value judgments embodied within the model can be
valid, useful offerings. Therefore, the term "model" will be used throughout the balance of
the article to refer to a deterministic decisional model for the takings issue. Similarly, the
terms "modeler" and "modeling" will refer to the deterministic theorist and enterprise.
[Vol. 61:372
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per se, taking."' 14 Costonis relies on non-constitutional property
law and "ordinary language" to determine when a "taking" that
triggers the presumption has occurred.' 5 The balance of the model
provides the structure whereby the government may overcome the
presumption.
Costonis styles the second element of his model the "due
process-takings phase."1 6 The issue is "[w]hether a linkage exists
between the purpose of a measure and the use of the affected prop-
erty."1 7 The government's failure to establish the link is a suffi-
cient, although not necessary, condition for the "taking"
conclusion.' 8 Without the linkage, the Court must find a taking
without further resort to the other elements of the model. If the
linkage is found, the analysis proceeds to the third element.
Costonis's third element, the "pure takings phase," asks
whether the measure infringes more severely than necessary to
achieve the intended goals.' 9 Using this third element the Court
asks whether there is a less property-damaging way to achieve the
goals, presumably excluding the always theoretically available and
less damaging alternative of paying compensation.
An obvious difficulty with both the second and third elements
is determining the weight of the government's burden. The fourth
element of Costonis's model addresses this point. The character of
the government's showing will depend on the relative weight of the
competing values.20 The decisionmaker ranks the values asserted
by the government and, alternatively, by the property owner on a
scale from more significant to less significant. The government's
scale runs from safety as most significant to "less well-established
police power ends" as least significant.2 ' The property owner's
14 See Costonis, supra note 6, at 469 (emphasis omitted).
15 Id. at 515.
16 Id. at 485.
17 Id. at 487. Costonis provides an example to explain this phrase. Suppose a state
passes an antiexclusionary zoning statute requiring every municipality to designate within
its land use control system certain residential zones in which twenty percent of any new
housing units must be set aside for, and be affordable by, moderate and low income fami-
lies. If a landowner/developer whose land is designated for moderate and low income
housing challenges the controls as a taking, the issue in the due process-takings element is
whether the developer's proposed use, construction of residential units for profit, is linked
to the antiexclusionary zoning purpose of the measure. Costonis does not answer the ques-
tion but suggests that the government has a strong argument on these facts. Id. at 489-91.
The example is taken from Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) ("inclusionary zoning" not a taking). But see
Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County v. DeGroff Enter., Inc., 214 Va. 235, 198 S.E.2d
600 (1973) ("inclusionary zoning" held a taking).
18 Costonis, supra note 6, at 487.
19 Id. at 495.
20 Id. at 499.
21 Id. at 500.
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scale ranges from the "dominion" interest which is most significant,
to the financial interest which is least significant.22 The dominion
interest is analogous to the social science idea of the "territorial
imperative." 23 The government's physical and permanent ouster of
a citizen from her home would implicate the dominion interest.
The combination of a dominion interest being thwarted by a less
well-established police power end would impose the heaviest bur-
den on the government.24 Other permutations would produce
lesser burdens.
Costonis analogizes value ranking to the tiers of review in the
civil liberties area. 25 He analogizes the heaviest burden to the
22 Id. at 499.
23 Id. at 523 n.237 (citing R. AUDREY, THE TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE: A PERSONAL IN-
QUIRY INTO THE ANIMAL ORIGINS OF PROPERTY AND NATIONS (1966)).
24 "Government's burden will be less stringent in conflicts between public safety and a
landowner's economic interest in property, for example, than in conflicts in which a less
well-established police power goal is opposed to the proprietor's dominion interest." Cos-
tonis, supra note 6, at 500.
25 Costonis extends his analogy to two types of "civil liberties" cases-land use regula-
tions which impinge on free speech values and the equal protection/gender discrimination
cases. He describes the standard of review in the land use cases as "requiring a 'narrowly
drawn regulation' furthering a 'sufficiently substantial governmental [interest].' " Id. at 522
n.231 (quoting Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68-71 (1981)). The
gender discrimination cases, according to Costonis, are governed by an "intermediate level
of scrutiny." Id. at 522.
The actual standard of review employed by the Court in the land use/free speech cases
is, however, much more uncertain than Costonis suggests. The cases Costonis relies on are
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), and Schad v. Borough of
Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981). In Metromedia the Court struck down San Diego's
billboard ordinance. 453 U.S. at 521. In Schad the Court held the borough's ordinance
excluding live entertainment unconstitutional. 452 U.S. at 76-77. Each case spawned five
separate opinions, with no opinion commanding the unqualified agreement of a majority of
the Court. The opinions reflect a Court splintered on the question of the appropriate stan-
dard of review. The cases are, to borrow Justice Rehnquist's characterization of the Me-
tromedia opinions, "a virtual Tower of Babel." 453 U.S. at 569.
The gender discrimination cases are also far less straightforward than Costonis implies
by his simple "intermediate level of review" label. Costonis cites a series of cases to sup-
port his proposition that gender discrimination triggers an "intermediate level" of scrutiny
under the equal protection clause. Costonis, supra note 6, at 522 n.230. Yet in none of the
cases cited did a majority of the Court join in an opinion enunciating the "intermediate
level" of scrutiny. For example, in the most recent case cited by Costonis, Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976), Justice Brennan's opinion does say that "classifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives." Id. at 197. However, Justice Brennan was able to per-
suade only two other Justices to join the opinion without qualification. Each of the other
Justices wrote a separate opinion, yielding an aggregate of seven opinions in Craig. The
Justices expressed different standards of review and even skepticism of the entire "tiers of
review" concept. Although more recent cases suggest that most of the Justices embrace
some form of "heightened scrutiny" in the gender discrimination context, the basic dishar-
mony persists. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (a
gender discrimination case in which the Court split 5 to 4 in four separate opinions).
The Court's most recent equal protection pronouncement also reflects the tenuous
nature of the tiers of review concept. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S.
Ct. 3249 (1985), the Court struck down, on equal protection grounds, a zoning ordinance
[Vol. 61:372
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"strict scrutiny" concept. The fourth element of the model
prescribes the level ofjudicial scrutiny. The level of scrutiny will be
graduated from an active to a more passive review of the govern-
ment's judgment that it may undertake an action without providing
compensation. The level of scrutiny will depend upon the compet-
ing values and manner of government infringement. 26
Costonis's model is best understood by contrasting it with the
Court's approach in its 1983 decision, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhat-
tan CA TV Corp. 27 Costonis uses the Court's approach in Loretto as
the foil for his theory. In Loretto a New York City landlord chal-
lenged a state statute which allowed cable television companies to
place cables and other equipment on or within apartment buildings
without the landlord's consent, but with the payment of a fee set by
a state commission. The landlord challenged the statute as an un-
compensated "taking" of her property. 28
The Court held that the statute affected an unconstitutional
taking of the landlord's private property.29 In the majority opinion,
Justice Marshall set forth the basic rule which decided the case and
his sense of the Court's general approach to the takings issue. "We
conclude that a permanent physical occupation authorized by gov-
erment is a taking without regard to the public interests that it
which required a special use permit for a group home for the mentally retarded. 105 S. Ct.
at 3260. The Cleburne case spawned three opinions which, taken together, cast serious
doubt on the helpfulness of the tiers of review model in equal protection cases. The major-
ity opinion purported to apply a rationality test and concluded that the ordinance was irra-
tional. Justice Marshall's separate concurring/dissenting opinion (in which Justices
Brennan and Blackmun joined) accused the majority of applying a standard of review
stricter than mere "rationality." Id. at 3263-65 (Marshall,J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). The concurring opinion, authored by Justice Stevens and joined by ChiefJus-
tice Burger, is essentially an assertion that there is no such thing as the tiers of review in
equal protection analysis. Id. at 3260 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Powell has also expressed uncertainty about the nature of the equal protection
doctrine:
The problem is this: in a democratic society there inevitably are both winners and
losers. The fact that one group is disadvantaged by a particular piece of legisla-
tion, or action of government, therefore does not prove that the process has failed
to function properly. To infer othenvise-that the process has been corrupted by
invidious discrimination-a judge must have some substantive vision of what results
the process should have yielded. Otherwise he has no way to know that the pro-
cess was unfair.
Powell, Carolene Products Revisited, 82 CoLuM. L. REV. 1087, 1091 (1982) (emphasis in
original).
Costonis has created a model which he believes will move the Court's takings jurispru-
dence away from the confusion of the ad hoc approach. As part of this effort, he believes
that his model will move takings jurisprudence, at least in form, closer to the civil liberties
jurisprudence. Ironically, the civil liberties jurisprudence is, if anything, more confused
than the takings jurisprudence.
26 Costonis, supra note 6, at 499.
27 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
28 Id. at 424.
29 Id. at 421.
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may serve."30 Apart from permanent physical occupations, "the
Court must engage in essentially ad hoc factual inquiries." 3' The
approach embodied in Justice Marshall's opinion splits challenged
governmental action into two categories: permanent physical occu-
pations and all other forms of governmental action. The Court will
only apply a per se taking rule to permanent physical occupations,
and will engage in an ad hoc analysis in cases involving any other
type of governmental action.
Costonis makes the Loretto approach the point of contrast for
his alternative theory.3 2 His model rejects the split, subjecting all
takings cases to the same decisionmaking model. His model also
offers coherence and precision, which are apparently lacking in the
ad hoc approach.
Costonis explicates his model by applying it to the Loretto case.
Analysis under his model begins with the presumption of a taking.
"[F]rom the standpoint of real (or personal) property law and ordi-
nary language" property has been taken by the operation of the
New York statute. 33 Once a presumption of taking is established,
Costonis's analysis jumps to the fourth element, which will deter-
mine the weight of the government's burden in overcoming the
presumption. The values advanced by the New York statute and al-
ternatively the values of the landlord which are threatened by the
statute must be identified and placed on the value spectrum. In
Costonis's view the government's purpose was not to aid cable
companies, but rather to provide "important communications and
education benefits to tenants and to other cable subscribers state-
wide."3 4 Where this particular value falls on the spectrum of wel-
30 Id. at 426.
31 Id. (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978)).
32 "Loretto is splendid foil for this article because the points of disagreement between
the two are clearcut and fundamental." Costonis, supra note 6, at 471.
33 Id. at 515.
34 Id. at 517. Neither the majority nor dissenting opinion in Loretto challenged the pub-
lic benefit characterization of cable television. The Court thereby avoided addressing the
question of whether the New York law, even if it provided compensation to the landlords,
would be a taking for a "public use." See generally Ross, Transferring Land to Private Entities by
the Power of Eminent Domain, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 355 (1983); Meidinger, The "Public Uses"
of Eminent Domain: History and Policy, 11 ENVTL. L. 1 (1980); Berger, The Public Use Require-
ment in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203 (1978); Note, The Meaning of Public Use in the Lanl
of Eminent Domain in Urban Renewal, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1422 (1955); Comment, The Public Use
Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599 (1949). One could argue
that the primary purpose of the law was to aid the cable television companies and that the
regulation, even if it provided compensation, failed to satisfy the "public use" limitation.
This argument, however, is unlikely to sway the contemporary Court given their decision in
Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2330-31 (1984). In that unanimous opinion
the Court equated the "public use" limitation with the substantive due process "rational-
ity" standard and stressed the Court's deferential attitude to the legislative judgment of
public benefit. See id. at 2330-31.
[Vol. 61:372
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fare values he does not make clear. Costonis classifies the
landlord's interests as essentially financial, falling "sufficiently close
to the economic side of the property values spectrum."35 He sug-
gests that an intermediate level of scrutiny, analogous to that em-
ployed in the gender discrimination cases, flows from this particular
constellation of values.3
6
Given the intermediate burden, one must ask if the second ele-
ment, "use-dependency," is satisfied. The landlord's use is resi-
dential rental for profit; the government's purpose is to facilitate
cable service to tenants. Without clearly answering the question,
Costonis points out that "few relationships in this century have
been subject to such extensive legal modifications and regulations
as that between landlord and tenant." He then implies that the use-
dependency element is satisfied.3 7
Turning to the "pure takings phase," the third element of the
model, Costonis emphasizes the landlord protections built into the
statute.38 The statute mandates some attention to the landlord's
interests as to the location of the equipment and provides for cable
company liability for any damage to the building. He seems to con-
clude that the state could probably carry its burden of proving that
the statute does not infringe more severely than necessary on the
landlord's interests. 39
Costonis does not clearly answer how his model would apply to
Loretto. The model, however, would require an analysis different
from Justice Marshall's per se rule. Additionally, the state would
appear to have a distinct chance of winning under the model, par-
ticularly in light of the intermediate level of judicial scrutiny.
Costonis's model might provide the starting point for any
35 Costonis, supra note 6, at 523.
36 Id. at 522-23.
37 Id. at 519. In the quoted language Costonis reveals a problem with his particular
model. While it is true that the landlord/tenant relationship has been extensively regu-
lated, that observation has no direct relationship to the issue of use-dependency. Use-de-
pendency is an inquiry into the relationship between the owner's use of the property and
the goal of the particular governmental regulation at issue. Extensive regulation of land-
lords for other purposes tells us nothing about the relationship between the landlord's use
of this property and the government's goal of facilitating cable television.
The observation seems relevant, however, if one assumes that landlords' reasonable
expectations are relevant to the takings issue and such expectations are likely to be affected
by the recent history of pervasive regulation. The assumed role of expectations in takings
analysis has support in the case law. See, e.g., note 98 infra and accompanying text. The
problem for Costonis is that the question of reasonable expectations of the property owner
has no place in his model.
38 Costonis, supra note 6, at 521.
39 "On its face, section 828 would appear to be carefully tailored to afford maximum
protection to landlord's property interest. And, given the Court's assessment of the en-
croachment-purposes relationship in opinions sustaining other kinds of physical invasions,
section 828 would appear to be constitutional." Id. at 521.
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number of intellectual endeavors. One could challenge the positive
claim and argue that recent takings cases do not fit the model.40
One could also challenge the normative claim and argue that his
model is the wrong model.41 A critic might also construct an alter-
40 The Loretto case obviously does not fit Costonis's model. He explains this as proof by
"negative example." Id. at 469-70. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984), a
recent takings case which postdates the Costonis article, also does not seem to fit the
model. Monsanto challenged the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) proposed
disclosure of trade secrets submitted by Monsanto to the EPA as part of the pesticide licens-
ing process. The EPA was operating pursuant to a federal statute which authorized the
disclosure of the trade secrets. Id. at 2869-70.
The Court unanimously concluded that the disclosure would affect a taking of Mon-
santo's property. The Court, however, drew an important line, protecting only the disclo-
sure of data submitted by Monsanto between 1972 and 1978. From 1972 to 1978 the
federal licensing statute contained some assurances of protection of the trade secrets from
disclosure. The 1978 amendments to the statute removed those assurances and explicitly
provided for disclosure. Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion suggesting that she
might extend the taking label to data submitted before 1972. Id. at 2883 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court in Monsanto rationalized the taking conclusion
and the line drawing by relying on the idea of "reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions." Id. at 2874-79. Justice Blackmun concluded that Monsanto had such expectations
with regard to data submitted between 1972 and 1978 but not at other times. Id. at 2879
n.17.
Costonis claims that his model is descriptive of the Court's direction. Yet an applica-
tion of the model to the Monsanto case does not account for the Court's decision. The first
element, a presumptive taking, seems satisfied. The trade secrets were protected under
state law. The disclosure of the trade secrets would seem to "take" the property in the
ordinary sense of the term.
With regard to the fourth element, the combination of interests which determines the
level ofjudicial scrutiny, the property owner's interest appears clear. Monsanto had only a
financial interest. The government's primary goal in disclosing the data was to promote
competition in the pesticide market and thereby benefit consumers. Thus, a purely finan-
cial interest was being threatened by a governmental action designed to promote a well-
established police power end, the promotion of competition. This particular combination
of values should yield either an intermediate or perhaps even a "rationality" scrutiny level.
Applying the second, "use-dependency," and third, "pure takings," elements, the gov-
ernment appears to have strong arguments. Monsanto was using its property to manufac-
ture pesticides. The government's goals in disclosing the trade secrets were to assist other
manufacturers in the pesticide industry, thereby promoting competition, and to enhance
public health and safety in the use of pesticides. The link between use and goals appears
clear; therefore, use-dependency seems satisfied. Applying the "pure taking" element, the
government did not seem to be using a heavier hand than necessary to achieve its goal.
Thus, Costonis's model would dictate a "no taking" conclusion in a case in which the Court
unanimously found a taking.
Even if one could conclude that either the second or third element is not satisfied, the
model still fails to account for the Monsanto decision because nothing in Costonis's theory
accounts for the Court's line drawing. If the "use-dependency" or the "pure taking" bur-
den is not carried by the government, presumably that would be as true after 1978 as it was
between 1972 and 1978. The lines drawn by the Court are drawn on the idea of expecta-
tions, an idea which the model does not accommodate.
41 Costonis's model represents a set of value choices which could be criticized in vari-
ous ways. See notes 181-94 infra and accompanying text. For example, a critic might chal-
lenge Costonis's elevation of the "dominion" interest to the position of prime importance.




native model.42 Throughout this article, however, Costonis's model
is used as an example of a way of thinking about the takings issue.
The critique will not focus on the normative or positive appeal of
Costonis's model or any other particular model. Instead, the article
focuses on the very idea of models for the takings issue and the
basic sense of constitutional interpretation projected by modeling.
This article argues that the intellectual enterprise of modeling the
takings issue is a misguided and undesirable enterprise, whatever
form the particular model takes.
II. Modeling
The intellectual enterprise of modeling may take the form of
positive or normative theorizing. A modeler who claims that his
model reflects the Justices' actual decisionmaking processes in past
takings cases is making a positive or descriptive claim. A modeler
who claims that any such model is somehow the right or appropri-
ate decisionmaking framework for the Justices is making a norma-
tive claim.
The modeler of the takings issue, whether making one or both
claims, assumes that a single decisional model can reflect the actual
decisionmaking process of each of the Justices in each of a range of
future (or past) cases which pose the takings issue. This assump-
tion embodies two levels of consistency. First, the modeler as-
sumes that the same model can be adopted and applied by each and
every Justice. Second, the modeler assumes that the same model
can be applied to each and every case that presents the takings is-
sue. The assumption evokes a particular image-nine Justices
reaching decisions in each takings case, with each Justice operating
within, and wholly within, a precisely drawn and shared decisional
framework. 43
42 The alternative model might take the form of either an amendment to Costonis's
model or a completely different model. An obvious amendment would be to change the
presumption of the first element from a presumption of "taking" to a presumption of "no
taking." See notes 181-82 infra and accompanying text. An altogether different model
might be patterned after the efficiency formula in Michelman's article. See Michelman, supra
note 10, at 1214-15.
43 This part of the article will be devoted to destroying the textual image in the context
of the takings cases. The article does not address the question of whether the problems
with modeling might extend beyond the takings issue to other areas of the Court's decision-
making.
Although the article makes no claims beyond the takings issue, the apparent break-
down of a decisional model in the establishment clause cases is worth noting. As a matter
of hornbook constitutional law, the establishment clause cases are resolved by a three-part
test:
When a law is challenged under the establishment clause it must pass a three part
test. First, it must have a secular purpose. Second, it must have a primary secular
effect. Third, it must not involve the government in an excessive entanglement
with religion. When the potentiality for excessive entanglement must be deter-
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Powerful reasons exist to doubt the reality of such an image.
First, the reality of the contemporary takings cases does not fit the
image. A review of these cases suggests that the Justices are di-
vided over the basic ways in which they view the takings issue as
they move from case to case.44 Second, certain features of the tak-
ings issue and the decisional process would account for such a divi-
sion within the Court.45 These features are not unique to the
contemporary Court and would persist despite a change in mem-
bership on the Court.46 Thus, any single decisional model for the
takings issue will likely fail in its positive theoretical aspiration,
whether applied to the contemporary or a future Court.
A. Contemporary Takings Cases
The contemporary Court has rendered both split and unani-
mous decisions in takings cases.47 This observation does not, how-
mined another three part test is employed. The degree of entanglement is esti-
mated by evaluating: (1) the character and purpose of the religious institution to
be benefited, (2) the nature of the aid, and (3) the resulting relationship between
the government and religious authorities. Additionally (although this may be con-
sidered a part of the entanglement test) the law must not create an excessive de-
gree of political division along religious lines.
J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, &J. YOUNG, CONSTITrrTIONAL LAW 1031 (2d ed. 1983). The break-
down of this test/model can be seen in the Court's most recent establishment clause cases.
In Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985), the Court struck down an Alabama statute
which prescribed a minute of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer" in the public
schools. Id. at 2492-93. Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court reiterated the three-part
test; the other five opinions demonstrate the weakness of the test as a decisional model for
the Court. See id. at 2489-90. Justice Powell in his concurrence defended the test, but this
defense only highlights the attacks by the otherJustices. Id. at 2493-96 (Powell, J., concur-
ring). Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment yet asserted the need to reexamine the
traditional test. Id. at 2496-505 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice White's dissent reiter-
ated his long-standing difficulties with the test. Id. at 2508 (White, J., dissenting). Justice
Rehnquist, in dissent, challenged the usefulness of the test. Id. at 2508-20 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). The most forthright attack on the test is set forth in Chief Justice Burger's
dissent: "The Court's extended treatment of the 'test' . . . suggests a naive preoccupation
with an easy, bright-line approach for addressing constitutional issues. . . . [O]ur responsi-
bility is not to apply tidy formulas by rote .. ." Id. at 2507 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). See
also Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3249 (1985) (WhiteJ, dissenting).
44 See text accompanying notes 47-115 infra.
45 See text accompanying notes 116-72 infra.
46 The term "contemporary Court" is defined here as commencing with the case of
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Although the defini-
tion is somewhat arbitrary, the takings jurisprudence commencing with the Penn Central case
involved virtually the same set ofJustices (only Justice O'Connor was substituted forJustice
Stewart) and spanned a period of time without the sort of significant social upheaval which
might make the term "contemporary" somehow inappropriate.
47 See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984) (unanimous decision in
favor of a taking); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)
(6-3 in favor of a taking); Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982) (5-4 in favor of no
taking); Hodell v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981) (unanimous decision in favor of no taking);
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (unanimous decision in favor of
no taking); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (unanimous decision in favor of no taking);
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ever, refute or establish the possibility of modeling. Under the
Costonis model, the Justices could each use the four elements of
the model and still disagree as to the ultimate conclusion. When
nine human beings each ask themselves whether a particular gov-
ernmental incursion satisfies the "use-dependency" element, occa-
sional disagreement on the answer is hardly surprising.48 On the
other hand, unanimity in decision does not assure the presence of a
single, commonly shared decisional framework. Nine human be-
ings can easily arrive at the same decision by different paths.49
Determining the actual decisionmaking processes of an individ-
ual or a group is difficult.50 Determining the actual decisionmaking
processes of the Court, where secrecy in deliberation is a funda-
mental tenet, is especially difficult.51 Scholars cannot observe the
interaction of the Court's conferences. Everything we know about
the Court's decisional processes comes initially from the Justices. 52
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (6-3 in favor of a taking); Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (6-3 in favor of no taking).
48 Costonis himself contemplates this sort of indeterminacy within his own model.
Costonis, supra note 6, at 524. He does not assert that his model will permit a sure predic-
tion of the outcome nor assure unanimous decisions. He does claim, however, that his
model can deliver "consistent, even-handed application of a coherent decisional approach
over time." Id. His model, although "deterministic," is not mechanical in operation. See
notes 11-13 supra and accompanying text.
49 The story of the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1954),
provides an example of a unanimous decision arrived at by different paths. ChiefJustice
Warren began with a divided Court and led them to unanimity in decision. How they got
there is a complex story. Different Justices were affected by different arguments. Law
clerks apparently played a significant role in some instances. Throughout, the leadership of
Chief Justice Warren seemed crucial. See B. SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF 72-127 (1983); R.
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 678-699 (1976).
50 See, e.g., Linblom, The Science of Muddling Through, 19 PUB. AD. REV. 79 (1959), reprinted
in part in R. RABIN, PERSPECTIVES ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 160-76 (1979). "[The]
advanced procedures [of the various decisional theories] remain largely the appropriate
techniques of relatively small-scale problem solving where the total number of variables to
be considered is small and value problems restricted." R. RABIN, supra, at 162. See generally
I. JANIS & L. MANN, DECISION MAING-A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, CHOICE,
AND COMMITMENT (1977).
51 The work of the social scientists who have studiedjudicial decisionmaking is summa-
rized infra at notes 145-54 and accompanying text. Most of these scholars have noted the
difficulty posed by the Court's tradition of secrecy. See, e.g., W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OFJUDI-
CIAL STRATEGY 200 (1964).
One scholar has explicitly pointed out the problems with using theories which are "the
products of laboratory groups which have had their every action (physical and verbal) care-
fully scrutinized by highly trained observers" and applying those theories to the Court. See
T. BECKER, POLITICAL BEHAVIORALISM AND MODERN JURISPRUDENCE 28 (1964).
52 The closest we can come to direct evidence of the decisional processes of the Jus-
tices, other than what the Justices choose to tell us in their opinions, are the accounts of
their law clerks. Although there is a supposed tradition of reticence attributed to the clerks,
exceptions exist. See, e.g., McCormack, A Law Clerk's Recollections, 46 COLUM. L. REX'. 710,
712 (1946) (a discussion of, inter alia, the decisional process ofJustice Sutherland in Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)). See also B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE
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The only substantial and available evidence regarding the Court's
decisional processes in the contemporary takings cases is to be
found in the opinions. Other sources, such as correspondence or
other personal papers of the Justices, are not yet available in any
substantial form.
53
Reading an opinion to discern the actual decisionmaking pro-
cess of the Justices, however, is always an uncertain quest. Opin-
ions serve multiple functions, some of which tend to obscure the
actual decisional framework employed. For example, in a case
where the Court divides, the language of an opinion may have a
coalition-forming function.54 The language of the majority opinion
may have to be tailored somewhat in order to capture the necessary
coalition. In the tailoring process the actual decisional framework
employed by the author may be disguised. 55 Moreover, Justices
may join in an opinion which, although it may reflect the decisional
process of the authoring Justice, does not truly reflect the deci-
sional process of the other Justices.
56
BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1979) (an account of the early years of the Burger
Court based largely on the revelations of the clerks). The revelations of the clerks, how-
ever, are too sporadic and selective to be of much help in understanding generally the
decisional processes of theJustices. Also, as with the opinions, a filtering effect exists-the
Justices choose what they share with their clerks and the clerks choose what they share with
the public. For a discussion of the filtering effect in the opinions, see notes 54-56 infra and
accompanying text.
53 Even when personal papers are available, the problems for the scholar who seeks to
understand the decisional processes of the Court are far from over. Justices will presuma-
bly be selective in what they choose to commit to writing. Even contemporaneously pre-
pared observations of the decisional processes, such as notes prepared during conferences,
may be prepared with the thought of future publication. The ordinary time lag in publica-
tion typically makes it impossible to discuss the notes with their author. Also, personal
papers are not routinely created and made available. Only a fewJustices have prepared and
made available a set of comprehensive personal papers. SeeJ. HOWARD, MR. JUSTICE MUR-
PHY viii (1968) (Justice Murphy kept "voluminous records"); A. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED
OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS vi (1957) (Brandeis' files "constitute a renewable reve-
lation"). Thus, the evidence from personal papers is both filtered and scanty. See Ulmer,
Bricolage and Assorted Thoughts on Working in the Papers of Supreme CourtJustices, 35 J. PoL. 286
(1973).
54 ChiefJustice Warren drafted the opinion in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954), in part for the purpose of holding onto the coalition. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note
49, at 95-101; R. KLUGER, supra note 49, at 694-98.
55 After publication of the opinion in Brown v. Board of Educ., commentators seized
upon footnote 11 which cited sociological studies relating to the performance of children in
segregated schools. 347 U.S. at 494 n. 11. Most commentators concluded that the footnote
was evidence that the Court had relied upon the sociological studies. See, e.g., Reston, A
Sociological Decision, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1954, at 14, col. 4 (quoted in R. KLUGER, supra note
49, at 711); B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 49, at 107. In fact, the evidence suggests that no
Justice read or relied on the studies. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 49, at 107-08.
56 Justices Brandeis and Holmes, for example, confessed to sometimes suppressing dis-
sents. See A. BICKEL, supra note 53, at 18. But see Hellman, The Proposed Interirruit Tribunal.
Do We Need It? Wil It Work? 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 375, 384 (1984) ("[T]here can be no
doubt that the members of the present Court, even more than their predecessors, have a
strong desire to make known their individual views in the cases before them."). For a gen-
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Nonetheless, the opinions provide a rough view into the deci-
sionmaking processes. We must assume that Justices do not rou-
tinely author, or even join in, opinions which do not roughly reflect
the way they view the case. Thus, the opinions, especially over a
range of takings cases, can tell us something of the decisional
frameworks involved.
The opinions in the contemporary takings cases in which the
Court split, Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 57 Kaiser Aetna
v. United States,58 and Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp. ,5
reveal a fundamental divergence in the ways of looking at the
cases. 60 In each of these cases, the contemporary Court revealed a
split in both the decision and the decisional framework.
1. Penn Central
In Penn Central, the Penn Central Transportation Company
challenged the constitutionality of the designation of its Grand
Central Station property as a "landmark site" under New York
City's Landmarks Preservation Law and the restrictions on develop-
ment which followed from the designation.61 Specifically, Penn
Central had entered into an agreement for the development of an
eral discussion of the limitations of relying on the Court's opinions, see Monaghan, Taking
Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV. 1 (1979).
57 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
58 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
59 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
60 The "contemporary Court" (see note 46 supra) has decided two unanimous takings
cases, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984), and Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51
(1979). Although unanimously decided, these cases imply a divergence in the Court's per-
ception of the takings issue.
In Monsanto (see note 40 supra) the Court, stressing the frustration of Monsanto's "dis-
tinct investment-backed expectations," held that the disclosure of trade secrets under cer-
tain circumstances would constitute a taking. 104 S. Ct. at 2879. In Andrus the Court
upheld federal statutes banning the sale of, among other things, eagle feathers. 444 U.S. at
67-68. The property owner had invested in the feathers for the purpose of resale and ar-
gued that the statute was a taking of his private property. Justice Brennan's opinion,
stressing the ad hoc nature of the inquiry, relied on the property owner's retention of the
right to possess, display, and donate the feathers (rights presumably of no interest to the
commercial feather merchant). Id. at 64-67. The Court relied on the idea that the owner of
the property was left with some residual interest in the property, however small the prop-
erty's residual commercial value. Id. at 66. The governmental action had not taken every-
thing.
The two cases seem dissonant. If the owner of the eagle feathers has some meaningful
residual interest, so it would seem does Monsanto. Monsanto is free to exploit the data and
may even enjoy some competitive advantage in having the data first. Conversely, if Mon-
santo's investment-backed expectations have been frustrated, so it would seem has the ea-
gle feather owner's.
The Andrus and Monsanto cases reflect the complexity of the decisionmaking process in
the takings cases. The particular features of each case which motivated the decision fail to
fit clearly and neatly into a particular model.
61 438 U.S. at 119.
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office tower in the airspace above Grand Central Station. The city
commission empowered to review the development called the pro-
posed development "an aesthetic joke" and withheld the necessary
approval. 62 Penn Central sued, challenging the City's action as an
unconstitutional taking of its private property without just compen-
sation. The Court, in a split decision, concluded "no taking."
63
Justice Brennan's majority opinion treats the takings issue as
an ad hoc, multifactor balancing inquiry. He begins the analytic
portion of the opinion by stressing the ad hoc nature of the deci-
sional framework in takings cases. 64 The general principles, such as
the degree of economic impact, operate in Justice Brennan's analy-
sis as background ideas against which the particular facts are con-
sidered, not as rules which determine the answer to the takings
issue. 65 Justice Brennan repeatedly relied on the particular features
62 [We have] no fixed rule against making additions to designated buildings-it all
depends on how they are done. . . . But to balance a 55-story office tower above
a flamboyant Beaux-Arts facade seems nothing more than an aestheticjoke. Quite
simply, the tower would overwhelm the Terminal by its sheer mass. The "addi-
tion" would be four times as high as the existing structure and would reduce the
Landmark itself to the status of a curiosity.
Id. at 117-18 (quoting the New York Landmarks Preservation Commission).
63 [W]e conclude that the application of New York City's Landmarks Law has not
effected a "taking" of appellants' property. The restrictions imposed are substan-
tially related to the promotion of the general welfare and not only permit reason-
able beneficial use of the landmark site but also afford appellants opportunities
further to enhance not only the Terminal site proper but also other properties.
Id. at 138.
64 "This Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula'..... Id.
at 124. "[The taking analysis] depends largely 'upon the particular circumstances .
Id. "[The Court engages in] essentially ad hoc factual inquiries .... " Id.
65 Id. at 123-28. Although Justice Brennan explicitly acknowledges the absence of any
set formula, his description of the twentieth century cases reads as though he would hope
to reconcile the cases by deriving principles of universal application. For example, he dis-
cusses Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), in which the Court held that Los An-
geles' prohibition of a preexisting brickyard operation from what had become a residential
area was not a taking, notwithstanding an overwhelming reduction in the market value of
the property. Hadacheck was decided, according to Justice Brennan, "on the ground that
the legislature had reasonably concluded that the presence of the brickyard was inconsis-
tent with neighboring uses." 438 U.S. at 126. Two paragraphs later in the opinion he
discusses Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), as though it were perfectly
consistent with his reading of Hadacheck. "[Pennsylvania Coal] is the leading case for the
proposition that a state statute that substantially furthers important public policies may so
frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to a 'taking'." Id. at 127.
WhatJustice Brennan does not say is why Hadacheck's expectations were not similarly frus-
trated, or conversely, why the Pennsylvania Coal Co. was not proposing to use their prop-
erty in a manner inconsistent with the surface owner/neighbor's use.
The last general principle Justice Brennan derives also reveals the difficulty of recon-
ciling the twentieth century cases. First, his own articulation of the principle gives the game
away. "Finally, government actions that may be characterized as acquisitions of resources
to permit or facilitate uniquely public functions have often been held to constitute 'tak-
ings.' " Id. at 128 (emphasis added). Second, his supporting citations include a "but see"
cite to YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85 (1969). In the IMCA case, U.S. troops attempt-
ing to quell riots in the Canal Zone had taken up positions in a privately-owned building.
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of the landmark preservation law and its impact on Penn Central.
For example, Penn Central argued that the application of the law
had "taken" its airspace. Justice Brennan responded that in this
case the appropriate property unit was the city tax block occupied
by the station and not just the airspace above the station.6 6 Penn
Central had in effect conceded the ability to earn a "reasonable re-
turn" on that larger parcel. 67 Penn Central also argued that the law
caused a significant diminution in the value of the property and did
so in a selective manner.68 Unlike zoning, which can also signifi-
cantly diminish property value, the landmarks law burdened only
selected parcels of property in the city.69 Justice Brennan's re-
sponse to this argument again shows a balancing approach with em-
phasis on the particular facts. In his view, the law reflected a
comprehensive plan for historic preservation; the procedures for
selecting landmark sites were not arbitrary, and Penn Central bene-
fited as a citizen/property owner in a city which preserved its his-
toric sites.70 Finally, in discussing the issue of whether the law as
applied to Grand Central Station had worked a diminution in value
of sufficient magnitude to require compensation, Justice Brennan
stressed two factual features: the possibility of the City's approval
of some lesser development of the airspace; and, the possible trans-
fer of the development rights to another city site owned by Penn
Central.7 1 In the ad hoc balancing framework these possibilities
sufficiently mitigated the impact of the regulation, permitting Jus-
Although the rioters inflicted substantial damage to the building as part of an assault on the
troops inside, the Court concluded that this was not a taking. Id. at 93.
66 "Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments
and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been en-
tirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has ef-
fected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and
on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole-
here, the city tax block designated as the "landmark site."
438 U.S. at 130-31.
67 Id. at 129. Penn Central's concession may be some evidence of the difficulty of mod-
eling the takings issue. Penn Central's presumably able lawyers may have assumed that
other factual features such as the selective nature of the landmarks law would have been
more important. The concession, which seems foolish in hindsight, may have simply been
the result of an educated but wrong guess as to the factual features which turned out to be
crucial in this particular takings case.
68 Id. at 131-32.
69 "[T]he New York City law embodies a comprehensive plan to preserve structures of
historic or aesthetic interest wherever they might be found in the city, and ... over 400
landmarks and 31 historic districts have been designated pursuant t6 this plan." Id. at 132.
70 Id. at 132-35.
71 Appellants... exaggerate the effect of the law on their ability to make use of the
air rights above the Terminal in two respects. First, it simply cannot be main-
tained, on this record, that appellants have been prohibited from occupying an'
portion of the airspace above the Terminal. While the Commission's actions in
denying applications to construct an office building in excess of 50 stories above
the Terminal may indicate that it will refuse to issue a certificate of appropriate-
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tice Brennan to conclude that compensation need not have been
paid.
Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, projected a different deci-
sional framework, a completely different way of looking at the tak-
ings issue in Penn Central. In contrast to Justice Brennan's ad hoc
balancing, Justice Rehnquist employed a combination of "literal"
reading of the constitutional language and strict reading of
precedent.
Justice Rehnquist, in effect, dropped the language of the fifth
amendment on top of the facts.72 For Justice Rehnquist, "prop-
erty" includes the right to use and develop airspace, both in its lit-
eral sense and as established by precedent. 73 He also concluded
that property has been "taken" when the government deprives the
property owner of its use, whether or not the government has for-
mally appropriated the property. 74 "[New York City has] thus de-
stroyed-in a literal sense, 'taken'-substantial property rights of
Penn Central."
75
ness for any comparably sized structure, nothing the Commission has said or done
suggests an intention to prohibit any construction above the Terminal.
Id. at 136-37 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
Their ability to use these rights has not been abrogated; they are made transfera-
ble to at least eight parcels in the vicinity of the Terminal, one or two of which
have been found suitable for the construction of new office buildings. Although
appellants and others have argued that New York City's transferable development-
rights program is far from ideal, the New York courts here supportably found that,
at least in the case of the Terminal, the rights afforded are valuable.
Id. at 137 (footnote omitted).
72 Id. at 141-42 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
73 Justice Rehnquist projects throughout his dissent the idea that the issues are well
settled as a matter of precedent. See id. at 138-53. While it is true that the principles which
he applied find support in the case law, making his cites technically correct, the precedents
are factually distinguishable from Penn Central. This factual distinction not highlighted by
Justice Rehnquist seems crucial to any takings analysis which purports to rely on precedent.
In support of his assertion that the term "property" includes air rights, he cites to a set
of cases each involving a physical encroachment by the government into the air space. See
Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256
(1946); Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922); Butler
v. Frontier Tel. Co., 186 N.Y. 486, 79 N.E. 716 (1906). He does not discuss the factual
distinction between cases of physical encroachment (cited cases) as opposed to cases of
regulation of development (Penn Central).
74 438 U.S. at 143-44 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist relies upon three
cases for the proposition that deprivation of use, even without formal appropriation, consti-
tutes a taking. Although each case can be thought of as supporting the general proposition,
each case involved an element of physical intervention by the government which makes it
distinguishable from Penn Central. See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963) (government's
reclamation project diverts water away from land); United States v. General Motors Corp.,
323 U.S. 373 (1945) (government appropriates leased space from tenant; "just compensa-
tion" deemed to include some consequential damages); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S.
445 (1903) (government's construction of dam on Savannah River floods rice plantation
land).
75 438 U.S. at 143 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Justice Rehnquist asserted that the "taking" label can be
avoided only if the case fits one of the two historical precedential
exceptions-the "nuisance" (or "noxious use") exception and the
"reciprocity" exception. 76 He derived from precedent the "nui-
sance exception," the principle that the state may deny uses of
property which harm other members of the community. 77 By con-
trast, Penn Central was not proposing to use its airspace in a way
which would harm others. In fact, New York City was acting to pre-
serve a use (or nonuse) of the property which benefited New
Yorkers and visitors. Thus, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the
case fell outside the confines of the traditional nuisance
exception. 78
In Justice Rehnquist's view the case also fell outside the reci-
procity exception exemplified by traditional zoning.79 Traditional
zoning regulation imposes restrictions on all property within a
community and, while individual property values will be dimin-
ished, property owners as a group and over time will share in the
benefits, at least in theory.80 Unlike zoning, the application of the
76 Id. at 144-50.
77 Id. at 144-46. The "nuisance" exception is built around the distinction between uses
of property which harm neighbors versus uses which do not harm (or even benefit) neigh-
bors. The doctrinal principle is that uses of property which harm neighbors are susceptible
to regulation or prohibition without compensation. Justice Brennan does not find the dis-
tinction helpful. Id. at 133-34 n.30. Some commentators have questioned the logic of the
harm/benefit distinction. See, e.g., Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules,
and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CI. L. REv. 681, 728-31 (1973); Sax, Takings and the
Police Power, 74 YALE LJ. 36 (1964); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1
(1960). The essential difficulty with the harm/benefit distinction is that when neighboring
uses of property conflict, it is simplistic to say that one neighbor's use is harmful, thereby
implying that the other neighbor's use is benign. The conflict results from the particular
combination of uses. For example, a cement plant spewing particulates and located next to
a residence might be said to be a harmful use. One might even suggest that the cement
plant is "causing" the problem. The characterization is simplistic because the conflict
would not arise if the residence were, for example, another cement plant. The conflict
arises because of the combination of a cement plant next to a home. In this sense the home
is as much a cause of the problem as the plant. When the owner of the residence seeks a
shutdown of the cement plant, is he seeking to prevent a harm or is he seeking to capture
the benefit of a nonoffensive alternative use of the neighboring property? Similarly, if an
"aesthetic joke" were to be constructed over the terminal, would Penn Central be harming
the neighbors or would the neighbors merely be denied a benefit previously enjoyed?
The common law of nuisance from which the "noxious use" exception is borrowed
reflects the complexity of sorting out the respective rights and liabilities of conflicting uses.
The court may permit a "noxious use" to persist so long as the noxious user pays damages
to its neighbors. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870,
309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970) (the social utility of the noxious cement plant outweighed the
utility of the residential neighboring uses). The noxious use may be ousted, but with the
proviso that the neighbors pay to the noxious user the cost of relocating or shutting down.
See Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972).
78 438 U.S. at 146 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
79 Id. at 147.
80 The "reciprocity" label was used by Justice Holmes in the Mahon case. See Penn-
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landmark law singled out Penn Central's property. An enormous
burden was thus imposed on Penn Central, a burden not offset by
similar and reciprocal restrictions on its neighbors. Thus, Justice
Rehnquist concluded that the case was not an example of the reci-
procity exception.
8'
Justices Brennan and Rehnquist disagree in Penn Central not
simply because they find different answers to common questions;
they also bring different sets of questions and different decisional
frameworks to the takings issue.82 Justice Brennan asked in effect-
what is the sensible solution given the particular facts of Penn Cen-
tral as those facts are viewed against a backdrop of basic ideas? He
used precedent to reaffirm the basic background ideas. Alterna-
tively, Justice Rehnquist asked-what are the relevant rules and
what do they tell us to do? Precedent is used to derive the rules.
The facts of Penn Central become relevant only to the extent that
they relate to the rules. To the extent the opinions do reflect the
decisionmaking frameworks of the Justices who wrote and joined in
the opinions, the Penn Central opinions are evidence that the con-
temporary Justices do not operate according to the modeler's first
assumption of consistency, i.e., each and every Justice is using a sin-
gle, common decisional framework.
2i, Kaiser Aetna
The Court split again, in both its decision and decisional
framework, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States.8 3 Kaiser Aetna had spent
considerable sums of money in the development of a "marina-style
community" surrounding Kuapa Pond on the island of Oahu, Ha-
waii. As part of the development work, Kaiser Aetna dredged the
Pond and built channels connecting it with the Pacific Ocean, work
done with the knowledge and acquiescence of the Army Corps of
Engineers. The Pond itself was treated as private property by Ha-
waiian custom and history and was leased by Kaiser Aetna. The
United States filed suit to obtain public access to the Pond, assert-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Holmes attached the adjective "av-
erage" to the term, presumably recognizing that land use regulation in practice does not
assure actual reciprocity in every particular instance. See note 127 infra and accompanying
text.
81 [A] multimillion dollar loss has been imposed on appellants; it is uniquely felt
and is not offset by any benefits flowing from the preservation of some 400 other
'landmarks' in New York City. Appellees have imposed a substantial cost on less
than one-tenth of one percent of the buildings in New York City for the general
benefit of all its people.
438 U.S. at 147 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
82 The two opinions also diverge on more particular ideas. Justice Brennan explicitly
rejected the value of the harm/benefit distinction implied in the nuisance cases. Id. at 133-
34 n.30. Justice Rehnquist found the "reasonable return" idea unhelpful. Id. at 149 n.13.
83 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
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ing that the Pond, post-dredging, was part of the navigable waters
of the United States and therefore subject to the navigation servi-
tude of the commerce clause. 84 Kaiser Aetna asserted that subject-
ing Kuapa Pond to public access would constitute a "taking" of
their private property. A divided Court agreed and concluded
"taking." 85
Justice Rehnquist changed both his role and his decisional
framework in Kaiser Aetna from his position in Penn Central. Writing
for the majority in Kaiser Aetna, Rehnquist championed the ad hoc
perspective on the takings issue:
As was recently pointed out in Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), this Court has generally
"been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when
'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by
public action be compensated by the government, rather than
remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons." Id.
at 124. Rather, it has examined the "taking" question by engag-
ing in essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries . ... 6
Throughout the opinion, Justice Rehnquist projected this ad hoc
decisional framework.
The first hurdle to the decision was the set of precedents which
seemed to stand for the hornbook principle that the riparian owner
is not entitled to compensation for loss resulting from the regula-
tion of navigable waters.8 7 "[T]he strict logic of the more recent
84 Id. at 168.
85 Id. at 179-80.
86 Id at 174-75.
87 "The United States has power to legislate with respect to navigable bodies of water
because it has power to regulate commerce. A riparian or littoral owner is not entitled to
recover damages even if he suffers a loss due to legislation relating to navigation." W.
BURBY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 45 (3d ed. 1965).
The actual picture which emerges from the cases is more complex. In Monongahela
Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893), the government took over the Pitts-
burgh-Morgantown canal system. The condemnation award, following the explicit direc-
tions of the enabling statute, excluded the company's right to collect tolls, and only the
tangible property taken was included in the computation ofjust compensation. The horn-
book resolution of this case would be that the riparian owner has no legally-recognized
interest in navigable waters and no right to compensation when the government's action
takes value from him which is attributable to the navigable waters. In Monongahela the
Court held that the award must include compensation for the toll rights. Id. at 34445.
Justice Brewer characterized the case as a collision of the commerce clause and the fifth
amendment, concluding that the commerce clause legitimated the action but the fifth
amendment required compensation. Id. at 341-42. Because the state and federal govern-
ment had encouraged the private investment, the toll rights became "vested" and compen-
sation was required. Id. at 34445.
The hornbook rule was seemingly revived, however, in United States v. Chandler-Dun-
bar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913), which involved the condemnation of land on the
St. Mary's River, a navigable body of water. Landowners holding title to the waterbed
sought compensation for the diminution in value attributable to the loss of water power.
Justice Lurton, speaking for a unanimous Court, concluded that the landowner had no right
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cases limiting the government's liability to pay damages for riparian
access, if carried to its ultimate conclusion, might completely swal-
low up any private claim for 'just compensation.' "88 Justice Rehn-
quist explained all this away by the Holmes adage-"the life of the
law has not been logic, it has been experience"89-and by describ-
ing the older navigation servitude cases as "[o]ld, unhappy, far-off
things, and battles long ago." 90
Thus freed of precedential obstacles, Justice Rehnquist applied
the ad hoc decisional framework by focusing on the particular fea-
tures of the case. 9' Kaiser Aetna invested millions of dollars on the
important assumption that it would have exclusive use of the Pond.
The Army Corps of Engineers acquiesced in the dredging work that
made the Pond "navigable waters." Although an "estoppel" theory
is supposedly unavailable against the United States, the govern-
ment's actions lead to the "fruition of a number of expectancies
to compensation for value attributable to the water power of the navigable waters. Id. at 73-
74. Oddly, Justice Lurton did permit the landowner compensation for the "element of
value [attributable to the] availability of these parcels of land for lock and canal purposes."
Id. at 76.
Four years later in United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917), the Court resurrected
the commerce clause/fifth amendment clash. The government's damming of navigable riv-
ers raised the level of water on a non-navigable stream and thereby diminished the water
power of the property owner's mill. The court found that "[t]he right to have the water
flow away . . . unobstructed, except in the course of nature" is a compensable right,
notwithstanding that the governmental action causing the obstruction was done under the
navigation servitude. Id. at 330. The hornbook rule was losing two to one, but the game
went on.
In United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945), the government
constructed a dam on the Mississippi River which raised the water level on the St. Croix, a
navigable river, and thereby took away the head for the landowner's power plant. Justice
Jackson stated that the right to the head did not have the support of the law and hence
there was no taking. Id. at 502.
Even if Cress and Willow River can somehow be reconciled by the naviga-
ble/nonnavigable distinction, Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) throws
everything back into disarray. In Kaiser Aetna the waters were clearly "navigable," yet the
imposition of the navigation servitude was deemed a taking. Id. at 180.
88 444 U.S. at 177.
89 Id. Quotations from Holmes are widely used and rarely put into context. See R.
POHLMAN, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES AND UTILITARIAN JURISPRUDENCE 1 (1984)
(twentieth century reviewers have reduced Holmes's ideas to "a bundle of aphorisms");
White, The Rise and Fall ofjustice Holmes, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 51 (1971) (American intellectuals
have focused on Holmes the "stylist"). 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw (1881), from which
the Rehnquist quote is taken, is a complex work. See, e.g., G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERI-
CAN LAw 51-56 (1977); 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (M. Howe ed. 1963) (editor's intro-
duction). Moreover, the language surrounding the aphorism used by Justice Rehnquist is
anything but a clear mandate to ignore troublesome historical precedents. Within the same
paragraph Holmes states: "[The law's] form and machinery, and the degree to which it is
able to work out desired results, depend very much upon its past." 0. HOLMES, THE COM-
MON LAw, supra, at 2.
90 444 U.S. at 177.
91 Id. at 178-80.
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embodied in the concept of 'property.' "92 Justice Rehnquist also
suggested that the imposition of the servitude might be character-
ized as an "actual physical invasion."93 He concluded that if the
government wanted to make Kuapa Pond into "a public aquatic
park," it must pay just compensation.
94
Justice Blackmun, author of the dissent, viewed the case differ-
ently. He relied on the application of four abstract principles, each
derived from precedent. First, waters subject to the "ebb and
flow," like Kuapa Pond, are "navigable waters." 95 Second, the nav-
igation servitude extends to all navigable waters, and hence to
Kuapa Pond.96 Third, a property owner's loss related to the
owner's "access to, and use of, navigable waters" is a non-compen-
sable loss, no matter how significant the riparian owner's invest-
ment.97 Finally, the status of the relevant waters under state law
cannot alter the federal constitutional analysis. 98 Thus, the treat-
92 Id. at 179.
93 Id. at 180.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 180-81 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun relied on the "ebb and
flow" test even though an alternative test for navigable waters, "navigable in fact" is clearly
met, at least post-improvements. He hoped to establish that the Pond was navigable waters
prior to the private investment, thereby permitting a different characterization of the case.
If the Pond was navigable waters before the improvements, one cannot say that the prop-
erty owner created the navigable waters by its investment. Id. at 182-84.
96 ME at 186-87.
97 It at 188-89. Justice Blackmun discussed and distinguished Monongahela Naviga-
tion Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893). 444 U.S. at 189 n.6 (Blackmun,J., dissent-
ing). He argued that in Monongahela the government "actively encouraged" the private
development; in Kaiser Aetna the government merely "acquiesced." Moreover, "the Gov-
ernment must now compensate for improvements it might not have undertaken if it were at
liberty independently to assess the advisability of opening the pond to navigation." Id.
To support his reading of the Monongahela case Justice Blackmun cited Lewis Blue
Point Oyster Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913). In Lewis, Justice Lurton declared that the
Monongahela case "really rests upon estoppel." WhatJustice Lurton meant by "estoppel" is
not clear. Id. at 89. Estoppel could conceivably encompass acquiescence coupled with reli-
ance of the Kaiser Aetna sort as well as active encouragement.
The more significant point raised in Justice Blackmun's footnote is the idea that the
government would not have chosen to spend the sums necessary to open the Pond to navi-
gation. 444 U.S. at 189-90 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). If this is true, it suggests that
either the costs of opening up the Pond overwhelmed the real and substantial publicly
shared navigation benefits or, perhaps, the navigation benefits were not that significant. If
the latter were the case, one could argue that the assertion of the navigation servitude over
the Pond was an unnecessary sacrifice of private property interests.
98 Id. at 191-92. Justice Blackmun chose not to challenge the majority's assertion that
the Pond was private property under Hawaiian law. Id. at 191. From the majority's descrip-
tion of the Pond's status under Hawaiian law, it seems unclear whether ponds, once they
are not simply fish ponds but navigable waters, would be private property under Hawaiian
law.
Professor Michelman concludes that the Kaiser Aetna case "illustrates] the existence of
a direct, constitutional property right" and not merely the recognition of property rights
protected under extraconstitutional state law. Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right,
38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097, 1106 (1981). Justice Rehnquist lent some support to this
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ment of Kuapa Pond as private property under Hawaiian custom
was irrelevant. Applying these four principles, Justice Blackmun
concluded no taking.
99
The opinions in Kaiser Aetna demonstrate a split in perception
which belies the image of a single, common model. Justice Black-
mun searched for the answer in the strict application of abstract
rules derived from precedent. Justice Rehnquist, after shedding the
constraints of precedent, saw a collision of constitutional provisions
which could only be resolved by careful attention to the particular
features of Kaiser Aetna. Again, the opinions show a divergence in
decisional frameworks. No single, common decisional framework
can be drawn out of the Kaiser Aetna opinions.
Kaiser Aetna also casts doubt on the second level of consistency
essential to modeling, the assumption that the Justices will consist-
ently use the same decisional framework in every case that presents
the takings issue. Justice Rehnquist apparently applied a literal
reading, precedential framework in Penn Central and an ad hoc, non-
precedential framework in Kaiser Aetna.
This apparent inconsistency may arise from the modeler's as-
sumption that the Justices will put all cases invoking the takings is-
sue into the same analytic pigeonhole. 00 The Justices may in fact
see a greater degree of distinction among cases. For example, Jus-
tice Rehnquist might consistently use the literal approach in all his-
toric preservation/takings cases and the ad hoc approach in all
navigation servitude/takings cases. If this were the case, a single
model for the takings issue would fail, but a set of models of the
various subcategories of takings cases might be viable.
Modeling of takings jurisprudence by using different models
for different categories of cases will not, however, be likely to suc-
ceed. First, any multiple model theory which included the ad hoc
approach would not be true to modeling's basic tenets. The ad hoc
view by declaring that the government's acquiescence might have led "to the fruition of a
number of expectancies embodied in the concept of 'property.'" 444 U.S. at 179. This
language seems to imply that expectations, not necessarily supported by extraconstitutional
state property law, can become "property" under the fifth amendment.
99 Id. at 192 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
100 One who seeks to pigeonhole the takings cases must first decide whether a particular
case constitutes a takings case at all. For example, inJustice Brennan's Penn Central opinion
he lists Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), as a takings case. Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978). Yet in Goldblatt the property
owner did not allege the facts necessary to advance a fifth amendment takings claim. The
opinion in Goldblatt focused on the substantive due process inquiry. 369 U.S. at 590-91.
A similar problem exists with regard to Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922). See notes 133-36 infra and accompanying text. AlthoughJustice Holmes used the
term "taking," some have argued that his use was metaphoric and that the case was
grounded only in the substantive due process issue. See, e.g., Williams, Smith, Siemon,
Mandelker & Babcock, The Vhite River junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REV. 193, 210 (1984).
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approach is not a true model, as the term has been defined here. l0 1
The ad hoc approach permits a freewheeling and mutable deci-
sional process which is the antithesis of the precision and constancy
of modeling. Second, although it is possible thatJustice Rehnquist
decides takings cases in a way that could be accurately represented
by a set of models, certain features of the takings issue and deci-
sional process undercut the possibility. 102 Moreover, even ifJustice
Rehnquist could be so modeled, the features to be discussed sug-
gest that his set of models will not be the Brennan, or even the
Burger, models.
3. Loretto
The final case to be considered in this part of the article best
exhibits the intensity of division in decisional frameworks within the
contemporary Court. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp. 103 a New York City landlord challenged a state statute which
allowed cable television companies to place cables and other equip-
ment on and within her apartment building, without her consent,
but with the payment of a nominal $1 fee set by a state commission.
The majority of the Court concluded that the statute effected an
unconstitutional taking of the landlord's property. 10 4
Justice Marshall's majority opinion and Justice Blackmun's dis-
sent exhibit a particularly striking dissimilarity in decisional
frameworks. Justice Marshall resolved the takings issue by applying
a per se abstract rule-"a permanent physical occupation author-
ized by the government is a taking without regard to the public in-
terests that it may serve."10 5 He derived the rule from a dubious
reading of precedent, 10 6 noted that recent cases did not explicitly
101 See notes 7-13 supra and accompanying text. All models, even deterministic ones,
will have an irreducible element of "ad hocery." The decision to invoke the model, the
perception of a "takings issue," is ad hoc. The deterministic modeler would seek to keep
the "ad hocery" to that minimal level.
102 See notes 116-72 infra and accompanying text.
103 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
104 Our holding today is very narrow. We affirm the traditional rule that a perma-
nent physical occupation of property is a taking. In such a case, the property
owner entertains a historically rooted expectation of compensation, and the char-
acter of the invasion is qualitatively more intrusive than perhaps any other cate-
gory of property regulation.
Id. at 441.
105 Id- at 426.
106 None of the cases cited byJustice Marshall directly addressed the de minimis issue at
the heart of the Loretto case. In some of the cases the Court found a taking where the
government caused significant flooding damage to property. See United States v. Lynah,
188 U.S. 445 (1903); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871). In other cases the
Court found a taking where the value of the property had been significantly diminished. See
United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950) (government's activities
caused under-flooding of land destroying its usefulness as agricultural land); United States
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repudiate the rule, and argued that "the purposes of the Takings
Clause compel its retention."' 10 7 Employing this decisional frame-
work, Justice Marshall placed the New York statute in the "perma-
nent physical occupation" pigeonhole, and the takings issue was
resolved, mechanically and without further ado. 10 8
The Blackmun dissent projected the ad hoc balancing deci-
sional framework, in sharp contrast to the per se rule. "[T]akings
claims are properly evaluated under a multifactor balancing
test." 09 Applying this balancing test, Justice Blackmun stressed
the analogy to other forms of landlord regulation, such as regula-
tions requiring landlords to put mailboxes and fire extinguishers in
apartment buildings.1 10 He also stressed the minimal size of the in-
vasion and the presumably minimal negative (if not positive) impact
on the building's fair market value.' t The decisional framework
revealed in the dissenting opinion relied on the particular features
of the Loretto case and a balancing of interests, not on the applica-
tion of an abstract per se rule.
v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917) (government's activities raised the level of a stream and de-
stroyed the usefulness of the property as a mill site). Justice Marshall cited two cases in
which the Court concluded no taking. See Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146
(1924); Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217 (1904). He also relied on two cases in which
the taking question was not the issue. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co.,
195 U.S. 540 (1904) (issue concerned whether federal law granted the telegraph company
the power of eminent domain); City of St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92
(1892) (issue concerned the city's charge for use of public property).
107 458 U.S. at 426.
108 [W]e have long considered a physical intrusion by government to be a property
restriction of an unusually serious character for purposes of the Taking Clause.
Our cases further establish that when the physical intrusion reaches the extreme
form of a permanent physical occupation, a taking has occurred. In such a case,
"the character of the government action" not only is an important factor in resolv-
ing whether the action works a taking but also is determinative.
Id.
109 Id. at 451 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
110 [O]ther New York multiple dwelling statutes not only oblige landlords to sur-
render significantly larger portions of common space for their tenants' use, but
also compel the landlord-rather than the tenants or the private installers-to pay
for and to maintain the equipment. For example, New York landlords are re-
quired by law to provide and pay for mailboxes that occupy more than five times
the volume that Teleprompter's cable occupies on appellant's building. If the
State constitutionally can insist that appellant make this sacrifice so that her ten-
ants may receive mail, it is hard to understand why the State may not require her
to surrender less space, filled at another's expense, so that those same tenants can
receive television signals.
Id. at 453 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). See also id. at 452.
111 "At issue are about 36 feet of cable one-half inch in diameter and two 4" X 4" X 4"
metal boxes. Jointly, the cable and boxes occupy only about one-eighth of a cubic foot of
space on the roof of appellant's Manhattan apartment building." Id. at 443. "As a practical
matter, the regulation ensures that tenants living in the building will have access to cable
television for as long as that building is used for rental purposes, and thereby likely in-




The divisions of Penn Central, Kaiser Aetna, and Loretto go deeper
than differences in decision. The opinions in these cases exhibit
differences in decisional frameworks that make modeling of the
contemporary Court's takings cases problematic. Moreover, the
problem is not simply two different factions of Justices employing
only two distinct decisional frameworks. The decisional frame-
works differ not only among the Justices in any particular case, but
also for at least some of the Justices individually as they move from
case to case. For example, Justice Rehnquist projected a literalism
and strict reading of precedent in his Penn Central dissent;112 while
in his Kaiser Aetna opinion he cast aside precedent as "old, unhappy,
far off things" and became an advocate of the ad hoc approach. 113
Justice Blackmun showed a similar ambivalence in his choice of de-
cisional approaches from his dissent in Kaiser Aetna to his dissent in
Loretto. In Kaiser Aetna he used a precedential perspective and re-
solved the takings issue by a strict reading and application of the
historical navigation servitude cases." 14 But in Loretto, Justice Black-
mun chastised the majority for "reach[ing] back in time" for their
decisional framework and embraced the ad hoc "multi-factor bal-
ancing" approach.1 5
Opinions must, of course, be used with care. One cannot al-
ways rely upon the opinions for an accurate picture of the deci-
sional frameworks employed by the Justices. Nonetheless, the
strong and pervasive divisions revealed in the opinions of the con-
temporary takings cases belie the existence of a suppressed, pre-
cisely drawn and shared decisional framework, even after one takes
into account the lessons of legal realism.
The contemporary Court has exhibited a division in decisional
frameworks. The difficult question remaining is whether these
problems for modeling are restricted to the contemporary Court.
Because certain features of the takings issue and the Court's
processes account for the division, modeling is equally problematic,
whether one looks to the Court of the past, present, or future.
B. Relevant Features of the Takings Issue and the Court's Processes
Certain features of the takings issue and the Court's processes
account for the division in the ways in which the Court sees and
decides takings cases. First, the Justices bring a mixed philosophi-
cal perspective to the takings cases. They cannot entirely escape
the literal reading of the takings clause; a reading of the clause
112 See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
113 See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
114 See notes 95-99 supra and accompanying text.
115 See note 109 supra and accompanying text.
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which denies the legitimacy of sacrificing individual property inter-
ests in the pursuit of the public welfare. Yet each Justice also em-
braces to some degree a utilitarian reading of the clause which can
legitimize the sacrifice of individual property interests. This mix
can push a Justice in different directions and invoke entirely differ-
ent sets of questions, all in the context of a single case. Second, the
Justices each bring distinct life experiences to the Court and thus
will see cases somewhat differently. Third, the cases which reach
the Court will typically be the "hard cases" which pose the most
difficult factual settings for the resolution of the takings issue. Fi-
nally, the modeler's problems are compounded by the Court's char-
acter as a group decisionmaking body composed of decisionmakers
who enjoy a relatively high degree of autonomy.
1. Philosophical Perspectives
The takings cases of the twentieth century exhibit an apparent
inconsistency." 16 An obvious explanation for the inconsistency is
found in the passage of time and the change injustices, even within
the limited temporal framework of the twentieth century. 1t7 That
the takings jurisprudence of the early twentieth century is in some
ways different from the takings jurisprudence of the latter twentieth
century is hardly startling.
Another part of the explanation of the inconsistency involves
what has remained constant throughout the period, at least from
the 1920s to date. The Justices' basic perceptions of the takings
issue have been a mixture of a sense of the literal command of the
language of the fifth amendment, that, no matter the public welfare
gains, no individual's property is to be taken without compensation,
and a sense of the desirability of government reallocation of prop-
erty interests and recognition that some reallocation might be
thwarted if compensation is demanded. The takings issue has thus
been caught up in the uncertain and evolving status of private prop-
erty in the twentieth century American welfare state.1 8
The takings clause reads as a simple, straightforward impera-
116 See notes 3-5 supra and accompanying text.
117 The most dramatic example of a change in constitutional jurisprudence occurring
within the twentieth century and attributable in part to a change inJustices is the rise and
fall of substantive due process as a vehicle for the constitutional invalidation of economic
regulation. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 434-55 (1978). Professor Tribe
suggests, however, that the Court is exhibiting a "recently reborn willingness to protect
'economic rights.' " Id. at 42 (Supp. 1979). See also R. MCCLOSKEY, THE MODERN SUPREME
COURT (1972) (discussing the emergence in this century of the constitutional "civil rights"
idea).
118 A classic statement of the conflict between the welfare state and notions of private
property can be found in Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). See also Goldberg




tive: "nor shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation."' 1 9 In its literal reading it expresses a principle
which denies the legitimacy of individual sacrifice to achieve the
greater good. In theory, the takings cases could be decided by ref-
erence to the philosophy of non-sacrifice. Governmental action
which "takes" (in an ordinary language sense) "private property"
(as defined by the protective reach of extra-constitutional law)
would be a fifth amendment "taking."1 20 Difficult questions would
arise at the boundaries of the definitional reach of the terms "take"
and "private property."' 2 1 Nonetheless, the takings cases could be
decided by reference to a philosophy which protects "property"
and disavows the sacrifice of the individual.' 22
The takings clause could also be interpreted by reference to
some form of utilitarianism.123 In deciding whether a particular
governmental incursion should be deemed a taking, the Justices
could focus on the particular consequences expected to follow from
their decision and act so as to maximize social utility.' 24 Although
difficult questions would arise as part of the process of predicting
consequences and comparing societal gains and losses, 125 takings
119 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
120 This mode of interpretation is much like that employed by Justice Rehnquist in his
Penn Central dissent. See notes 72-75 supra and accompanying text. It is also essentially the
approach embodied in the first element of Costonis's model.
121 The Court noted, but avoided, an interesting boundary question in Duke Power Co.
v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S, 59 (1978). The federal Price-Anderson Act
limited the liability of the nuclear energy industry in the event of a nuclear disaster to $560
million. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b) (1983). The Act also provided for federal government contri-
bution to the indemnity fund and a strict liability rule for compensation. Id. at § 2210(c).
Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Act, asserting, inter alia, that in the event of
a nuclear catastrophe their property would be destroyed without the assurance ofjust com-
pensation. The boundary questions were whether the plaintiffs' interest in some future
potential right to recover was "property" and whether the Act had "taken" the property.
The Court avoided the issue by concluding that the Act did not withdraw any potential
actions for a taking under the Tucker Act. "The further question of whether a taking claim
could be established under the Fifth Amendment is a matter appropriately left for another
day." 438 U.S. at 94 n.39. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 117, at 44-45 (Supp. 1979).
122 See R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS-PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
(1985) (Professor Epstein argues for the literalist interpretation).
123 See B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 41-70 (1977) (Acker-
man's "utilitarian adjudication" of the takings cases).
124 Professor Michelman provides a utilitarian formula for adjudication. "The correct
utilitarian statement, then, insofar as the issue ofcompensability is concerned, is that compensa-
tion is due whenever demoralization costs exceed settlement costs, and not otherwise."
Michelman, supra note 10, at 1214-15 (emphasis in original).
125 For example, any utilitarian adjudication of a takings case which relied on the com-
putation of demoralization costs would be inherently uncertain. Valuing the frustration felt
by the property owner and her sympathizers, and projecting the losses due to the reluc-
tance to invest in property because of the insecurity generated by an uncompensated reallo-
cation of property rights are difficult even in the most straightforward contexts.
Nonetheless, takings cases could be decided by reference to the utilitarian philosophy, with
each Justice making their best guess as to the uncertain elements like demoralization costs.
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cases could still be decided by reference to the utilitarian philoso-
phy, a philosophy which seeks to maximize social utility and accepts
the sacrifice of individual property interests.
126
A Justice with the pure literal sense of the clause could see a
takings case from a dramatically different perspective than a Justice
with the pure utilitarian sense of the clause. For example, if a com-
prehensive land use regulation is adopted by a community, some
property owners will be denied proposed uses of their property,
uses which would have been permitted before the regulation.
Some of these property owners will not in fact receive any recipro-
cal benefits from the regulation. They will be true losers. 127 If the
losers challenged the regulation as a taking, the "literalist" Justice
would ask whether the property owners had a "property" interest
in the now prohibited uses of their land. If so, compensation must
be paid, without regard to any utilitarian calculus. The "utilitarian"
Justice would ask if this was an efficient sacrifice by the individual
But see Soper, On the Relevance of Philosophy to Law: Reflections on Ackerman's Private Property
and the Constitution, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 44 (1979). "On difficult moral and social issues,
the utilitarian's task of toting up and comparing consequences so outweighs in practical
importance the theoretical direction that only consequences count as to make that direction
mostly useless." Id. at 45.
126 For example, applying the Michelman formula, whenever settlement costs exceed
demoralization costs, compensation is not due, even though some property owners will
suffer uncompensated losses. If this occurs, the uncompensated property owners are in a
sense sacrificed for the greater good.
The adoption of zoning by a community provides an example of such sacrifice.
Although some property owners will suffer diminution in both their rights and property
values, the standard rule is "no compensation." The "no compensation" rule may bejusti-
fied on the ground that the costs of determining the individual losses are far larger than the
demoralization costs which may occur. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926). When a Euclidean zoning scheme is adopted by a community, some of the property
owners are in a sense sacrificed to achieve the benefits of land use controls. See note 127
infra and accompanying text.
127 The property owner in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (the case
which established the federal constitutionality of zoning), appears to be an example of the
true loser. The effect of the zoning ordinance which prescribed residential use for land
which the owner had slated for industrial development was to diminish the value of the
property by approximately 67-75%. The Euclid site, however, was eventually rezoned and
developed for heavy industry. By the early 1970's the area around the Euclid site had be-
come a hodge-podge of land uses.
If you take a look at an aerial photograph of the area, you will find the following
developments, each extending from Euclid Avenue north toward the railroad.
First, a factory; then six blocks of single-family homes (five solid blocks, plus two
more half-block strips at each end); then a shopping center; then a single street
(two block fronts) of single-family residences; then another factory; then the
Cleveland-Euclid boundary line, and a vacant block; then a 1100-unit garden
apartment project; then two-and-a-half blocks (five block fronts) of residences;
then another and larger factory, which is on the Euclid site. A more appalling
jumble would be difficult to imagine, and this is the case which has been cited for
years on the principle of protecting residential areas against the intrusion of com-
merce and industry.
N. WILLIAMS, 4 AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAw 16-17 (1975).
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property owners. The utilitarian would want to know whether the
broadly shared welfare gains of the regulation exceeded the losses
imposed on the losers. He would ask about the relative costs of
discerning and paying off the losers versus the costs suffered if no
compensation were paid.128 His concern would be to maximize the
societal pie, whatever the property status of the individual interests
sacrificed. 129 Depending on the answers to these questions, the lit-
eralist and utilitarian Justices might reach the same conclusions. 130
Yet even when they agreed as to the proper outcome, they would
get there by different routes.
The Justices, however, do not fall into neat and pure philo-
sophical categories. The instability in twentieth century takings ju-
risprudence arises not because the Court is composed simply of a
mix of utilitarian and literalistJustices, but rather because each Jus-
tice has both a literal and utilitarian sense of the takings clause. 131
Moreover, this mixed philosophical perspective is hardly surpris-
ing. Each philosophical perspective is an important part of our in-
tellectual heritage. 3 2 The significance of the mix is that it can push
ajustice in opposite directions and raise different sets of questions,
128 For example, the utilitarian Justice might adopt a de minimis threshold. If the state
widens a road and takes one square foot of land (other than in midtown Manhattan), the
utilitarian Justice could conclude that the costs of discerning and paying compensation so
overwhelm the demoralization costs that compensation ought not be paid.
129 The term "maximizing the pie" is borrowed from A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO
LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 (1983). The more precise Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks definitions of effi-
ciency are unnecessary here.
130 These ideal types might agree on the necessity for compensation when the govern-
ment physically appropriates a substantial parcel of land. Their rationales, however, would
differ. The literalist Justice would rely on the obvious sacrifice of the individual property
interests. The utilitarian Justice would rely on the significant demoralization costs that
would result if the property owner were not compensated.
The Justices might disagree in the case of a government regulation which prohibited
vehicular and air travel within a wilderness area, rendering virtually useless a private hunt-
ing camp within the area. See Michelman, supra note 10, at 1223-24. The literalist Justice
might conclude that the regulation was a taking because it represented an attempt to sacri-
fice the individual interest for the conservation end. The utilitarian might disagree, con-
cluding that the demoralization costs in this case were small relative to the costs of
computing and paying just compensation.
131 See Oakes, "Property Rights"in ConstitutionalAnalysis Today, 56 WASH. L. REV. 583, 622-
23 (1981) (a discussion of the persistent "dualistic perception" of property rights).
132 The legal academic community's reception of J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
(197 1), a work of moral philosophy by a Harvard philosophy professor, is a good indication
of the current importance of the utilitarian and nonutilitarian philosophies. Rawls's book
provides an alternative to utilitarianism which he describes as the "predominant systematic
theory" for modern moral philosophy. J. RAWLS, supra, at vii. Rawls's own theory is "highly
Kantian" in nature, propounded in a set of basic principles which do not depend on partic-
ular consequences for justification, and rejects the legitimacy of treating individuals as a
means to some societal end. The legal academic community embraced the work. The
American Association of Law Schools awarded the book the Coif Award in 1973 for the best
"law book" written in the preceding three years.
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all in the same case. Thus, the mixed perspective does not facilitate
a single, precise decisional model.
Justice Holmes expressed the ambivalence in philosophical
perspective in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.133 In Mahon, the coal
company challenged Pennsylvania's Kohler Act which prohibited
mining which caused surface subsidence, despite the fact that the
coal company had reserved the right to do so in its property trans-
actions. Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes found an unconsti-
tutional taking of the coal company's property.
134
Justice Holmes spoke first of the utilitarian view. "Government
hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in
the general law."' 35 Government hardly could go on to intervene
in ways which we suppose increase social utility without imposing
some degree of individual sacrifice. Later in the opinion, however,
Justice Holmes expressed the literal sense of the takings clause.
"We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to im-
prove the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the
desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the
change."' 36 However large the social utility generated by a taking
of property, the state must nonetheless pay the individual.
The ambivalent sense of the takings issue has been carried for-
ward to the contemporary Court. In Penn CentralJustice Brennan's
opinion projected a utilitarian sense. He stressed the benefits to
New York of the preservation of Grand Central Station and the
facts which mitigated the costs imposed on Penn Central. l3 7 None-
theless, Justice Brennan invoked the literal sense of the clause and
133 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
134 Id. at 414. For a recent attempt to understand the Mahon case, see Rose, Mahon
Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 5 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984). A modern
Pennsylvania statute analogous to the Kohler Act, but applicable to the mining of bitumi-
nous coal, was recently challenged, inter alia, as a "taking." See Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 581 F. Supp. 511 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (statute upheld), aft'd, 771 F.2d
707 (3d Cir. 1985).
135 260 U.S. at 413.
136 Id. at 416.
137 Unless we are to reject the judgment of the New York City Council that the
preservation of landmarks benefits all New York citizens and all structures, both
economically and by improving the quality of life in the city as a whole-which we
are unwilling to do-we cannot conclude that the owners of the Terminal have in
no sense been benefited by the Landmarks Law.
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 134-35 (1978).
[T]he New York City law does not interfere in any way with the present uses of the
Terminal. Its designation as a landmark not only permits but contemplates that
appellants may continue to use the property precisely as it has been used for the
past 65 years: as a railroad terminal containing office space and concessions. So
the law does not interfere with what must be regarded as Penn Central's primary
expectation concerning the use of the parcel. More importantly, on this record,
we must regard the New York City law as permitting Penn Central not only to
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the illegitimacy of sacrifice: "[the takings clause] is designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public bur-
dens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the pub-
lic as a whole . . "138 Alternatively, Justice Rehnquist's dissent
initially adopted a literal reading of the takings clause. 3 9 Justice
Rehnquist, however, embraced the reciprocity exception which
contemplates a certain degree of individual sacrifice, presumably
justified by some utilitarian sense of the matter.140
This ambivalence in philosophy can also be seen, perhaps most
obviously, injustice Marshall's opinion in Loretto. The opinion ini-
tially conveys a literal sense of the takings clause: the per se rule
governs, particular consequences and the societal benefit calculus
are irrelevant.' 4 ' On the other hand, Justice Marshall reaffirms the
ad hoc test for regulatory incursions, a test which in cases like Penn
Central is used to implement a distinctly utilitarian analysis.'
42
The mixed senses of the takings clause reflected in the opin-
ions can also be seen in the societal value framework. We would be
reluctant to deny a utilitarian sense of the takings clause because we
would not wish to forego the increase in social utility which we be-
lieve flows from governmental intervention, including intervention
profit from the Terminal but also to obtain a "reasonable return" on its
investment.
Id. at 136.
138 Id. at 123.
139 The fifth amendment provides in part: "nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." In a very literal sense, the actions of [New
York City] violated this constitutional prohibition. Before the city of New York
declared Grand Central Terminal to be a landmark, Penn Central could have used
its "air rights" over the Terminal to build a multistory office building, at an appar-
ent value of several million dollars per year. Today, the Terminal cannot be modi-
fied in any form, including the erection of additional stories, without the
permission of the Landmark Preservation Commission, a permission which [Penn
Central], despite good-faith attempts, [has] so far been unable to obtain.
Id. at 141-42 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
140 Even where the government prohibits a noninjurious use, the Court has ruled
that a taking does not take place if the prohibition applies over a broad cross sec-
tion of land and thereby "secure[s] an average reciprocity of advantage." It is for
this reason that zoning does not constitute a "taking." While zoning at times
reduces individual property values, the burden is shared relatively evenly and it is
reasonable to conclude that on the whole an individual who is harmed by one
aspect of the zoning will be benefited by another.
Id. at 147 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original; citation omitted).
141 "We conclude that a permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a
taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve. Our constitutional history
confirms the rule, recent cases do not question it, and the purposes of the Takings Clause
compel its retention." Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426
(1982).
142 "[No 'set formula' exist[s] to determine, in all cases, whether compensation is con-
stitutionally due for a government restriction of property. Ordinarily, the Court must en-
gage in 'essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.'" Id. (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1918)).
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which by the utilitarian calculus ought to proceed without compen-
sation. 43 We would also be reluctant to ignore a literal sense of
the clause because the institution of private property is still taken
seriously. 44 The mix and ambivalence about the proper philo-
sophical foundation for the interpretation of the takings clause ex-
hibited by the Court is mirrored by our own mix of values. So long
as we and the Court feel this mix, the takings cases will be difficult
to manage and model.
2. Personal Variables
Academics from the political science field ("political behavi-
oralists") have written much about the decisionmaking process of
the Court. 145 Although the work differs in its hypotheses and meth-
odologies, certain common assumptions are evident, assumptions
which are inconsistent with the idea of modeling.
Political behavioralists apply social science theories to the
Court. They attempt to validate that application by some form of
empirical study, typically a correlation between some variable and
particular Justices' votes in particular categories of cases. Political
behavioralists tend to express their methodology in quantitative
terms. 146
Some political behavioralists find their particular variable
within the four corners of the opinions. For example, a behavioral-
ist might hypothesize a correlation between the presence of a labor
union as a party in a case and a particular Justice's decision in those
143 Noncompensatory land use regulation is a pervasive governmental action justified by
a perceived increase in social utility, yet a gain bought with the sacrifice of certain individu-
als' property interests. Even those who question the wisdom of land use regulation typi-
cally do so in part on utilitarian grounds, questioning the actual efficiency of the regulation.
See, e.g., Krasnowiecki, Abolish Zoning, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 719 (1980).
144 The public reaction to a compensated taking of property illustrates the textual point.
In 1981 the city of Detroit took by eminent domain a residential neighborhood and turned
the property over to General Motors as the site for a new auto assembly plant. Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981). Both
legal and non-legal commentators expressed concern. See, e.g., Michelman, Property as a
Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097 (1981); Bennett, Eminent Domain and Rede-
velopment: The Return of Engine Charlie, 31 DE PAUL L. REV. 115 (1981); Safire, Poletown
Wrecker's Ball, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1981, § A, at 31, col. 5; Cuomo, Reindustrialize, Construc-
tively and Humanely, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1980, § A, at 19, col. 4. Safire, for instance, saw
the case as threatening the "sanctity of private property." Safire, supra, at 31, col. 7.
145 See, e.g., G. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND REVISITED: PSYCHOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF
SUPREME COURT IDEOLOGY (1974); THE JUDICIAL MIND: THE ATrITUDES & IDEOLOGIES OF
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (1946-1963) (1965); W. MURPHY, FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RE-
SEARCH (J. Grossman and J. Tanenhaus ed. 1969); THE ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY
(1964). For a more thorough bibliography of social science work, see W. MURPHY & C.
PRITCHETT, COURTS, JUDGES AND POLITICS 693-700 (2d ed. 1974) (appendix).




cases. 147 The variable might, however, be found outside the opin-
ion. For example, some behavioralists look to off-the-bench state-
ments of values and hypothesize a correlation between those
expressions of particular values and decisions in particular catego-
ries of cases.148 Similarly, some behavioralists seek to link a Jus-
tice's social background with his decisions. 1
49
Although the behavioralists' work differs in methodology and
hypotheses, they each see the Court as composed of nine distinct
decisionmakers. By observing data, composed essentially of the
Court's decisions and variables such as off-the-bench expressions of
values, they attempt to correlate particular variables to decisions by
particular Justices. 150 While the behavioralists choose different
variables, the variables are all in a sense "personal" to the individ-
ual Justices.15 1 "Personal variables" are those which will inevitably
vary to some degree from Justice to justice. The social background
of the Justices will vary, as will their attitudes toward labor unions
or their off-the-bench expressions of values.152 Although the
behavioralists disagree as to the relevant variables, their work is
founded on the idea of understanding the differences in the deci-
sional processes among the individual members of the Court.
Thus, the basic premises of the behavioralists are wholly inconsis-
tent with the notion that the Court, as a unitary decisionmaking
body, is susceptible to a single model for any particular set of cases,
including the takings cases.153 For the behavioralists, any single de-
147 See Spaeth, Warren Court Attitudes Toward Business: The "B'" Scale, inJUDICIAL DECISION-
MAKING 79-103 (G. Schubert ed. 1963).
148 See, e.g., Danelski, Values as Variables inJudicial Decision-Making: Notes Toward a Theory,
19 VAND. L. REV. 721 (1966) (correlation of public expressions with the decisions of jus-
tices Brandeis and Butler).
149 See, e.g., Grossman, Social Backgrounds andJudicial Decision-Making, 79 HARV. L. REV.
1551 (1966).
150 "[My concern is] with the socio-psychological dimension of formal decisionmaking
behavior of this small, political elite group. [The] primary concern is with the motivations
which lead individual members of this small group to choose, in their conjoint voting be-
havior, to select certain alternatives rather than others." G. SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 11 (1959).
151 See, e.g., G. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND, supra note 145 (individual political atti-
tudes as variable); W. MURPHY, THE ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964) (individual
tactics and strategies); Grossman, supra note 149 (social backgrounds).
152 The justices, while individuals bringing different life experiences, attitudes, and
value systems to the Court, are far from a random cross-section of American society. They
are all members of an interpretive community with a tradition, structure, and admission
process which makes the Justices more alike than unlike, at least in some senses. See, e.g., G.
SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND, supra note 145, at 13 (noting the influence of the common-
alities of "legal training ofJustices, the institutional traditions of the Court, and the defined
procedures [of the Court]"); Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765, 770-71
(1982) (noting the racial, gender, and socio-economic homogeneity of the "legal interpre-
tive community"). Nonetheless, the residual differences will yield differing perceptions of
the "hard cases" they must decide. See note 154 infra and accompanying text.
153 Glendon Schubert, probably the most respected of the political behavioralists, has
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cisional model for the Court would be conceivable only if it were a
composite of the distinct models for the individuals who make up
the Court.
The work of the behavioralists is some evidence of the
enormous difficulty in truly understanding the decisionmaking
processes of individual Justices. Decades of work by thoughtful
scholars has produced a rich set of hypotheses, yet no single knock-
down behavioralist theory exists.
154
devoted decades of research to the study of the decisionmaking processes of the Justices.
See, e.g., G. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND REVISITED, supra note 145; HUMAN JURISPRU-
DENCE: PUBLIC LAW AS POLITICAL SCIENCE (1974);JUDICIAL POLICY-MAKING: THE POLITICAL
ROLE OF THE COURTS (rev. ed. 1974); THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITY (1970); COMPARATIVE
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1969); DISPASSIONATE JUSTICE: A SYNTHESIS OF THEJUDICIAL OPINIONS
OF ROBERT H. JACKSON (1969); THE JUDICIAL MIND, supra note 145; REAPPORTIONMENT
(1965);JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR: A READER IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1964);JUDICIAL DECISION-
MAKING (rev. ed. 1963); CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES AND THE CONSTrrUTIONAL POLICIES THAT THEY MAKE (1960); THE PUBLIC
INTEREST: A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY OF A POLITICAL CONCEPT (1960); QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS OFJUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1959); THE PRESIDENCY IN THE COURTS (1957).
Schubert's work has focused on the correlation between the political attitudes of the
individualJustices and their decisions. His own expression of the nature and significance of
his work is revealing:
As anything and everything that I have written surely will attest... the atti-
tudes ofjudges like, I presume, those of other persons have an important bearing
upon their choices in regard to certain types of decisions. So also do social rela-
tionships and interaction, the quantity and quality of information relied upon to
define the decisional issues, estimates of the probable implications of outcome al-
ternatives, beliefs about one's institutional role obligations, concern for the cul-
tural image that one will leave as his judicial trace, a host of largely unexplored
biological variables (ranging from temporary but acute physical illness to senes-
cence), and a variety of environmental and cultural variables. It is not impossible,
I believe, that the day may come (although I do not anticipate it in the present
century) when an operationalized dynamic causal model of human decisionmak-
ing, capable of being applied to the policy choices of Supreme Court Justices, will
be available to political scientists (or whatever may then be called persons who do
such work). But in the meantime, while more modest operations seem feasible
and appropriate to our limited competence as behavioral scientists, it may not be
inapposite to proceed incrementally, to see what can be learned about individual
classes of the variables that seem relevant to the ultimate definition of a more
adequate (and complicated) model.
G. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND REVISITED, supra note 145, at xiii. For Schubert the true,
precise model, although within his field of hope and imagination, is still beyond his intellec-
tual reach, notwithstanding the substantial work and many volumes devoted to the pursuit.
Moreover, the imagined model would be built by reference to the individual Justices.
154 Legal scholars have also stressed the significance of personal variables in judicial
decisionmaking. A recent example is Richard Danzig's article on Justice Frankfurter and
the "compulsory flag salute" cases. See Danzig,Justice Frankfurter's Opinions in the Flag Salute
Cases: Blending Logic and Psychologic in Constitutional Decisionmaking, 36 STAN. L. REV. 675
(1984). Danzig demonstrates how Frankfurter's cultural background played a large part in
how the Justice saw and decided those cases. Danzig's most striking and compelling point
is his explanation of the significance of personal variables by reference to the act of
imagination:
First, I believe that the act of imagining a case is a prerequisite to judging it. The
circumstances in a case do not unfold before a judge's eyes; the pivotal issues are
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A tremendous amount of work has addressed the question of
the Court's decisionmaking generally. This work, while not focus-
ing on the takings cases, is grounded in the idea that individual Jus-
tices will not operate according to a single common decisional
framework. The work of the political behavioralists and others who
have studied the decisionmaking process thus negates, explicitly or
implicitly, the idea of a single decisional model for the takings
cases.
3. Process Features
Certain basic features of the Court's processes make a single,
precise, predetermined model for the takings cases unlikely. First,
the takings cases which reach the Court are likely to be the "hard
cases" for which modeling is particularly ill-suited. Second, the
Court is a decisionmaking body composed of individual deci-
sionmakers who enjoy a relatively high level of autonomy, a deci-
sional context ill-suited for modeling.
The relevance of the "hard cases" feature is best explained by
sketching the analogy between modeling and statute drafting. A
model for the takings issue would function somewhat like a statute,
for it would consist of predetermined and explicit principles which
not self-evident; their resolution is not predetermined. Ajudge is asked to use the
information he is given to conceive what has happened and what is likely to hap-
pen as a result of hisjudgment. To decide [the flag salute case],Justices Stone and
Frankfurter (and their colleagues whom I have not discussed) had to imagine chil-
dren in schools and their relations with their peers, their parents and their teach-
ers. They had to imagine how a regulation came into being and how it might be
repealed. They also had to imagine what the implications of their decision might
be for minority groups, for freedom of religion, for the development of children,
and for the country's ability to create a unified population that might have to mo-
bilize for war. I anticipate that similar acts of imagination are required and accom-
plished in other major constitutional litigation. Second, I believe that this study
reinforces the hypothesis that, particularly in the Supreme Court of the United
States, these acts of imagination are often personal. In envisioning what has hap-
pened, a Supreme CourtJustice does not see witnesses, nor does he (at least typi-
cally) read through extended transcripts. Each advocate now normally has only a
half-hour for oral argument and about the same amount of ajustice's reading time
to convey what he thinks is important. In all but the rarest of cases, little of that
time is devoted to building a richly textured description of the facts and circum-
stances at issue. . . . In such situations, the Justices naturally fall back on their
own experience. Moreover, in looking beyond the case before him, each Justice
reflects the values and priorities he has developed over a lifetime, most especially
those made salient by the circumstances at the time of decision.
Id. at 719-20. Although Danzig might not put it this way, the problem with modeling the
Court's decisionmaking is that, while each Justice has imagination, the Court itself has no
imagination.
The application of psychological ideas to judicial decisionmaking of course is not new.
See, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). See also Hutcheson, The Judgment
Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929) (the
significance of personal intuition).
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would ostensibly shape the decisional process in future cases.1 55
The process of creating a model for the takings issue would resem-
ble, in some features, the process of drafting a code or statute. In
drafting a statute, the legislator must recall past and current dis-
putes and imagine future disputes to which the proposed statute
might apply. This process of recall and imagination permits the in-
telligent construction of a statute. To assure a rational foundation,
the legislator should test the proposed statute against certain hy-
potheticals. If the proposed statute yields "appropriate" outcomes
in these hypothesized cases, it passes the test.'
56
When a statute is well conceived, the basic features of the vast
majority of cases to which it will be applied will have been
imagined. For this majority of cases, the statute "works" in the
sense that the ends of its drafters can be achieved.' 57 Inevitably,
cases will arise which fall under the statute, but present features not
imagined by the drafters. These odd cases will, nonetheless, some-
times be sensibly solved by the statute's framework. This is a happy
coincidence. Sometimes the odd case will present factual features
which suggest that the sensible decision is not the one apparently
dictated by the statute. These cases could be thought of as the
"hard cases" under the statute.
Hard cases can be resolved by a court in one of two ways. The
155 There are of course important differences between a model and a statute. Most no-
tably, judges would typically feel restrained when required to decide a case governed by a
statute. When faced with a case to which a model applied, the sense of restraint would
typically be less. After all, the model is merely the creation of the scholars or the judges
themselves. Disappointing the scholars or changing one's mind about the model seems less
troublesome than defying the legislature. That is not to say that ajudge faced with a statute
is necessarily and wholly confined in decisionmaking. See Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of
Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 441, 458-60 (1979) (discussion of the specific
example of the courts' "disemboweling" of the code governing negotiable instruments).
See generally G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) (a discussion
of the continuing role for the common law in the current age of proliferating codification).
Moreover, a judge may feel some commitment to a model, particularly one which she has
publicly expressed.
156 An example of the blend of recall and imagination in statute drafting can be found in
the story of the initial drafting stage of the preference provisions of the Bankrupty Code, 11
U.S.C. § 547 (1982). The committee empaneled to create the initial draft tested its propos-
als against prior cases as well as imagined circumstances. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 179, 204-19, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6164-79
(Report of the Comm. on Coordination of the Bankruptcy Act and the Uniform Commer-
cial Code). The committee characterized its effort as a "rescue mission for unsecured credi-
tors." Id. at 208, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6168. For the argument that the
preference provisions failed to "rescue" unsecured creditors, notwithstanding the efforts of
recall and imagination, see Ross, The Impact of Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code Upon Secured
and Unsecured Creditors, 69 MINN. L. REV. 39 (1984).
157 The statute may not "work" in the sense of achieving the right or best outcome.
Moreover, the statute may not work even in the sense of achieving the drafters' ends if a
judge chooses to interpret the statute disingenuously. For the most part, however, the
imagined cases will be handled as the drafters have foreseen.
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statute might be faithfully applied, notwithstanding the injustice or
foolishness of the outcome. Alternatively, the statute might be "in-
terpreted" so as to achieve the sensible outcome. 158 Either way, so
long as the hard cases remain a relatively small part of the statute's
business, the statute can continue to work. When, however, the
hard cases begin to grow in number, the statute will be threatened.
A statute which in the majority of cases leaves judges with a choice
between a bad outcome or a disingenuous interpretation is likely to
be redrafted.
A Justice who seeks to resolve the takings issue by use of a
model is faced with problems similar to that of the statute drafter.
The Justice must recall and imagine takings cases to which the
model might apply. If the model is well conceived, the vast major-
ity of government incursions which raise the takings issue will be
sensibly reconciled by the principles of the model. Inevitably,
though, some of the future takings cases will not have been
imagined in all relevant factual features, and some of those cases
will be hard cases which move the Justice in directions contrary to
the model's dictates.1 59 When that happens, the Justice will be
faced with the choice between a troubling outcome or deciding
outside the confines of the model. One would expect and hope that
the Justice would take the latter choice. 60
As long as the hard cases are only a very small minority of the
cases governed by the model, the model would be a valuable piece
of theory. If, however, the hard cases overwhelm the ordinary
158 Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1982), provides a
good example of the problem of unimagined "hard cases." Chapter 13 was created for the
purpose of facilitating the repayment of creditors of insolvent debtors through court ap-
proved plans for repayment, typically over an extended period of time. The initial statutory
enactment unwittingly opened the door for the filing of what came to be known as "zero
payment" or "de minimis" plans. These plans contemplated no, or virtually no, payments
to the unsecured creditors, directly contrary to the assumed purposes of Chapter 13. See,
e.g., Dye, An Overview of Chapter 13-Its Uses and Abuses, 43 MONT. L. REV. 35 (1982); Dono-
hue, Anatomy of a Chapter 13, 97 BANKING L.J. 623 (1980); Note, Good Faith, Zero Plans and the
Purposes of Bankruptcy Code Chapter 13: A Legislative Solution to the Controversy, 61 B.U.L. REV.
773 (1981). The statutory provisions were eventually redrafted to address the problem. See
11 U.S.C. § 1325 (Supp. 11 1984).
159 As a hypothetical example of the limits of imagination, suppose thatJustice Holmes
and the other Justices joining in his Mahon opinion had intellectually embraced the "nox-
ious use" principle which permitted the regulation or abolition of uses of property which
generated substantial negative externalities. Prior to the Mahon case it is hard to believe
that any of them might have imagined such a case, even in its basic features. See notes 133-
36 supra and accompanying text. In Justice Holmes's case the hypothetical is probably
flawed because of his apparent uneasiness about the "noxious use" idea. See A. BICKEL,
THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 228-29 (1957).
160 In some instances the choice between a troubling outcome and deciding outside the
model can be a difficult one. If the model is promulgated by the Court as its model for
decision, and if in a particular case the outcome under the model is clear, a decision obvi-
ously made outside the model will generate its own set of costs.
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cases, the model will face the same fate as the statute. This is pre-
cisely the nature of the Court's predicament, as most of their tak-
ings cases will be hard cases.
Some forms of governmental intervention affecting property
interests fit a basic factual pattern for which the judicial outcome is
well established or widely assumed. For example, in today's takings
jurisprudence a modest depression of fair market value arising from
the application of an ordinary zoning scheme is assumed not to be a
taking. 16' The permanent, physical appropriation of a significant
parcel of land for some public purpose is assumed to be a taking. 16
2
These ordinary cases are unlikely to be litigated to the Court be-
cause the probability of a particular outcome is perceived as ap-
proaching one. Given the staggering costs of litigating up through
the Court, expending resources to push the ordinary case through
the litigation process would normally be irrational. 163 Moreover, to
the extent ordinary cases are sometimes taken into the litigation,
process, the Court's discretion in selecting cases will winnow out at
least some of them. 164 The Court, generally speaking, has little in-
terest in expending its resources to say something that everyone
believes they already know. Thus, although ordinary cases can slip
through, they are the exception and not the rule.
As a rule, the Supreme Court will decide the hard cases. For
example, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,165 a recent case in which the
Court held that the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) dis-
closure of Monsanto's trade secrets as part of the pesticide licens-
161 Euclid v. Ambler Reality Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), initially established the proposi-
tion. Subsequent cases have reaffirmed the proposition. See, e.g., Park Ave. Tower Assoc. v.
City of New York, 746 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1984) (inability of owners to receive reasonable
return on their investment did not in itself amount to an unconstitutional taking as a matter
of law), cert. denied, 40 Eastco v. City of New York, 105 S. Ct. 1854 (1985); Schafer v. City of
New Orleans, 743 F.2d 1086, 1089 (5th Cir. 1984) ("Every regulation of the use of prop-
erty, permanent or temporary, restricts the owner's freedom and may affect the value of his
property."). Each of these recent cases cited Euclid as controlling authority.
162 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), and cases
cited therein.
163 See, e.g., Priest & Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1984)
(disputes selected for litigation will constitute neither a random nor a representative sample
of the set of all disputes); Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer, & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary
Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REv. 72 (1983) (discussing the decision to litigate as an "investment
process"); Priest, Selective Characteristics of Litigation, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 399 (1980) (the
probability of litigation as a function in part of the parties' expectation of outcome). Any
particular party may not have rational expectations or ordinarily accepted ends. See, e.g.,
Bryden, A Phantom Doctrine: The Origins and Effects of Just v. Marinette County, 1978 Am.
BAR FOUND. REs. J. 397 (parties to litigation who refused settlement to chase "the white
whale of regulation").
164 TheJudiciary Act of 1925 gave to the Supreme Court "almost complete discretion to
select the cases that it would decide." Hellman, The Business of the Supreme Court I TUder the
Judiciary Act of 1925: The Plenary Docket in the 1970s, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1712 (1978).
165 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984). See note 40 supra.
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ing process was a taking, presented a factual setting which, in terms
of the Court's takings jurisprudence, was new. The Court had not
previously encountered a taking challenge to the federal pesticide
licensing scheme. Alternatively, Kaiser Aetna presented the naviga-
tion servitude problem, the setting of several takings cases, but with
the special features of estoppel and a large private investment
which created the conditions of navigability.
1 66
A model could be constructed which accounts for the vast ma-
jority of governmental incursions which affect property interests.
167
The problem is that the Court does not decide the vast majority of
such potential disputes. The Court decides an infinitesimally small
subset of takings disputes, a subset composed almost entirely of
hard cases, and therefore a subset ill-suited for modeling.
This "hard cases" feature is of course applicable to litigated
cases generally. Professor Priest expressed the point in an article
which examined the nature of litigated cases generally:
As long as the parties' expectations are rational, disputes for
which their estimates of success conflict will be those for which
true uncertainty exists, given whatever the underlying substan-
tive basis of the law is. Disputes litigated to judgment will be
those selected by the parties because of the high level of uncer-
tainty that attends their resolutiofi. As a consequence, litigated
decisions, viewed alone, will make the substantive basis of the
legal system appear indeterminate. It will be difficult to infer
stable and coherent aspects of the legal system from cases
whose consistent feature is indeterminacy.1 68
The point applies with equal if not greater force to the Court's
docket.
Finally, the court is composed of nine relatively autonomous
decisionmakers. To succeed as positive theory, any model would
have to be adopted by nine persons, each of whom is essentially
free to reject the model. 69 No formal mechanism for imposing the
166 See notes 83-102 supra and accompanying text.
167 Costonis's model might be just such a model. The taking status of most governmen-
tal incursions could be accurately accounted for under his model. Most of the incursions
resulting in permanent physical occupations which would be understood to be takings
could be rationalized under the model as failing the "use-dependency" element. But see
note 37 supra and accompanying text. Governmental incursions in the form of the regula-
tion of uses of property which are assumed not to constitute takings could be rationalized as
satisfying the "use-dependency" and "pure takings" elements, particularly if the regula-
tions primarily threatened the financial interests of the property owner.
168 Priest, supra note 163, at 416.
169 TheJustices constitute a small decisionmaking body. In any such body charisma and
leadership may influence a decision. Justices are not isolated from the influence of others.
See, e.g., Murphy, Courts as Small Groups, 79 HARV. L. R~v. 1565 (1966). Nonetheless, the"
enjoy a high degree of autonomy and freedom from coercion of the more formal sort. In
this sense, they are "essentially free" to reject the model.
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model exists. As previously discussed, 170 each of these deci-
sionmakers brings a different life experience to the Court, a life ex-
perience which will influence the particular facts and values which
that person finds significant in any particular case. 17 1 It is unrealis-
tic to expect that each of these autonomous decisionmakers will
adopt, or be persuaded to adopt, a common decisional model.
The contemporary Court exhibits a split in decisional
frameworks in the takings cases which makes modeling of that
Court seem hopeless. The explanation for this untidiness is likely
to apply equally to the future Court. So long as the Justices bring a
mixed philosophical perspective to the takings cases, they will see
these cases in fundamentally divergent ways. Yet the mixed philo-
sophical perspective is only part of the problem for the modeler.
The personal variables which will affect how a Justice sees a takings
case will differ, even if the Court is populated by Justices who all
identify with one side of the political spectrum. 172 Finally, the mod-
eler must operate-in a world of hard cases and autonomous deci-
sionmakers, a world where the facts of the case push and splinter
the Court, while no simple and effective mechanism for imposing
coherence and uniformity exists.
III. Formalism
Modeling of the Court's takings jurisprudence is unlikely to
fulfill its positive theoretical aspirations. The model's normative as-
pirations would also seem to go the way of the positive ones. If
modeling cannot succeed as positive theory, it seems odd to talk of
modeling as good or bad normative theory.
Modeling of the takings issue is, nonetheless, an idea which can
affect takings jurisprudence, however flawed it might be as positive
theory. The modeler peddles a set of assumptions about the basic
nature of the Court's interpretation of the takings clause. These
assumptions, if accepted, determine in part the intellectual ground
rules of the debate on the takings issue. Over time, the debate will
affect the face of our takings jurisprudence. Thus, modeling must
be reviewed critically, not simply by reference to its ostensible func-
tions, but as a potentially powerful idea.
The power of modeling is in its propagation of a formalistic
sense of the takings clause. The term "formalism" requires careful
definition because it has been used by different people and for dif-
170 See notes 145-54 supra and accompanying text.
171 See note 154 supra.
172 The obvious example is the performance of Earl Warren, the ChiefJustice, as con-
trasted with the expectations of the man who appointed him to the Court. B. SCHWARTZ,
supra note 49, at 125.
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ferent purposes. 1 " Formalism, as used here, is a matter of both
style and substance. Formalism is a style of speaking about consti-
tutional decisionmaking, a style which implies a particular substan-
tive sense of constitutional interpretation. As style, formalistic
theorizing uses apparently objective, abstract principles which dic-
tate the proper resolution of constitutional cases in a more-or-less
deductive manner. This style implies a sense of constitutional
interpretation in which decisions are made by the Justices from a
perspective outside their particular life experiences and value
framework. The formalistic theory itself is advanced as though it
too sprang from a source apart from its author's value framework.
Formalism is thus an expression of the possibility of constitutional
decisionmaking outside the battleground of ideology. 174
173 Karl Llewellyn used the term' "Formal Style" to describe a type of judicial
decisionmaking.
The Formal Style is of peculiar interest to us because it set the picture against
which all modern thinking has played-call it, as of the last eighty or ninety years,
"the orthodox ideology." That picture is clean and clear: the rules of law are to
decide the cases, policy is for the legislature, not for the courts, and so is change
even in pure common law. Opinions run in deductive form with an air or expres-
sion of single-line inevitability. "Principle" is a generalization producing order
which can and should be used to prune away those "anomalous" cases or rules
which do not fit, such cases or rules having'no function except, in places where the
supposed "principle" does not work well, to accomplish sense-but sense is no
official concern of a formal-style court.
K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION-DECIDING APPEALS 38 (1960). Llewellyn
used the term as a point of contrast for the "Grand Style," a style he sought to promote.
For the judge of the Grand Style, a precedent had to be tested by reason, principles had to
make patent sense, and "policy," in terms of prospective consequences of the rule under
consideration, comes in for explicit examination. Id. at 36.
Grant Gilmore also made use of the "formalism" idea. See G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF
AMERICAN LAW (1977). For Gilmore's evolving views on formalism, see Gilmore, Formalism
and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 441 (1979).
174 The sense of formalism evoked here is related to the definition found in Unger, The
Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983):
By formalism I do not mean what the term is usually taken to describe: belief in
the availability of a deductive or quasi-deductive method capable of giving deter-
minate solutions to particular problems of legal choice. What I mean by formalism
in this context is a commitment to, and therefore also a belief in the possibility of,
a method of legal justification that can be clearly contrasted to open-ended dis-
putes about the basic terms of social life, disputes that people call ideological,
philosophical, or visionary. Though such conflicts may not be entirely bereft of
criteria, they fall far short of the rationality that the formalist claims for legal analy-
sis. The formalism I have in mind characteristically invokes impersonal purposes,
policies, and principles as an indispensable component of legal reasoning. For-
malism in the conventional sense-the search for a method of deduction from a
gapless system of rules-is merely the anomalous, limiting case of this
jurisprudence.
Id. at 564. Unger's "formalism" focuses on the justification of the solutions offered for the
problems of legal choice.
Unger uses formalism as part of an effort to discredit certain ways of thinking about
legal issues and to bring about a new way of thinking which will facilitate change in the law,
change generally consistent with a leftist political agenda. In this article, the term "formal-
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This Part of the article argues that the basic assumptions of
modeling imply a formalistic sense of the takings clause; demon-
strates the formalistic character of Costonis's model, as an example;
and finally, discusses the costs of formalism.
The would-be modeler of takings jurisprudence will come to
the task with certain articles of faith. First, the modeler believes in
the possibility of models. He must see the takings cases as either
decided by, or susceptible to decision within, a model. Second, the
modeler believes in the desirability of models. The modeler abhors
ad hoc resolutions and embraces the coherence of the model. In
this regard the modeler longs for something more than a simple
understanding of the important considerations and ideas common
to most takings cases. He searches for the greater order and tidi-
ness of the model. The model, once found or created, is justified
by its apparent coherence. It can be used to sweep away the "ad
hocery." For the modeler this will be justification enough.
The modeler will find in the takings jurisprudence an irresisti-
bly unruly target. Although other constitutional law areas seem to
embody inconsistency,175 the opinions in the takings cases actually
proclaim the unruly character of takings jurisprudence by the re-
peated references to ad hoc resolution. t76 The modeler armed with
the articles of faith will create a model which ostensibly imposes
order and coherence, but functionally acts to mask the deep conflict
underlying the cases. The model offered will be justified by its
prima facie coherence and its touted house-cleaning function. The
justification for the model is likely to stop there. In the takings ju-
ism" is used to discredit a particular way of thinking about the takings issue. The specific
political direction of any change in the takings solutions, however, is not at issue here.
Moreover, a formalistic sense of the takings issue can be used to perpetuate or advance any
particular political agenda. One could easily construct a formalistic model which advanced
leftist political principles. See Alexander, The Concept of Property in Private and Constitutional
Law: The Ideology of the Scientific Turn in Legal Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1545 (1982) (a
discussion of the political and ideological assumptions of the scientific mode of legal analy-
sis, although not relying on the "formalism" terminology).
The use of formalism here is related to the more general debate of the possibility of
objectivity in constitutional interpretation. See generally Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid
Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983) (interpre-
tivism and neutral principles as the creation of modern liberals); Fiss, Objectivity and Intepre-
tation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982) (a plea for objectivity and against nihilism); Brest,
Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765 (1982) (interpretation is inevitably inter-
twined with political values); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959) (principles which transcend actual result). Recently, legal scholars
have turned to literary theory as a tool for debate. See Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L.
REV. 373 (1982) (the use of"deconstructionist" literary theory to argue the "nihilist" posi-
tion). Yet Professor Fish, a literary theorist upon whom Levinson relies, rejects the implica-
tions of legal nihilism. See Fish, Intepretation and the Pluralist I'ision, 60 TEX. L. REv'. 495
(1982).
175 See note 25 supra.
176 See, e.g., notes 64-65, 86 & 109 supra and accompanying text.
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risprudence, where the ideological conflict is fundamental and in-
tense, the suppression of the inherent ideology in the model is the
obvious path to coherence. Thus the modeler is likely to propose a
model which both masks the ideological conflict underlying the
cases and purports to be justified by considerations outside that
conflict. In this way a modeler is likely to be a peddler of the for-
malistic sense of the takings issue, whatever the precise form of
model proposed.
These points can be demonstrated by reference to Costonis's
model which embodies formalism both in its form and proffered
justification. The model is quasi-deductive in form in the sense that
the solutions purportedly flow from the answers to predetermined,
abstractly-phrased questions.177 When the questions are answered,
the solution springs forth in a deductive-like fashion. Costonis im-
plicitly assumes that each Justice will work within, and wholly
within, the model. Differences in ideology and life experience
among the Justices are all swept away. Moreover, what little justifi-
cation is offered for the model is carefully drawn outside the ideo-
logical clash. Costonis projects a value-neutrality to his model. 178
Costonis's model is composed of four abstract questions to be
applied in each case which raises the takings issue.1 79 The same
questions apply whatever the nature of the government interven-
tion or the property interest threatened. Navigation servitude cases
are resolved in the same way as historic preservation cases. Factual
elements outside the model's focus are irrelevant. For example, the
private investment and estoppel feature of Kaiser Aetna would be
disregarded as outside the model. 18 0 The model seeks to impose
order in a broad and abstract wray, casting aside anomalous factual
features and pigeonholing cases in the expansive "takings concep-
tual drawer." Thus, the solution to all takings questions follows in
a quasi-deductive, formalistic way from the answers to the model's
questions.
Costonis advances the model as a value-neutral takings theory
unlike other theories which he suspects are "by-products of the au-
thors' particular substantive values."'' Nonetheless, his model,
like the theories he criticizes, is inevitably an expression and order-
ing of certain values. An element-by-element review of the model
provides a framework for identifying this ordering.
The first element, the presumption of a taking, is a distinct
value choice. The obvious alternative not chosen is the presump-
177 See Costonis, supra note 6, at 469 (description of the model).
178 See note 181 infra and accompanying text.
179 See notes 14-26 supra and accompanying text.
180 See notes 91-94 supra and accompanying text.
181 Costonis, supra note 6, at 527 n.245.
1986]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
tion of no taking. As soon as Costonis decides to use a presump-
tion, he is inevitably faced with a value choice. Assuming that the
presumption is a meaningful feature of the model, that it will make
a difference in at least some cases, the choice between a presump-
tion of taking or no taking is a choice between the basic welfare and
indemnity values. When the taking presumption is chosen, the in-
demnity value is advanced to some extent over the welfare value.
The second element, the use-dependency issue, is a very pow-
erful part of the model. The model demands some connection be-
tween the government's purpose and the actual or intended use of
the property affected. A negative answer to this issue ends the in-
quiry. Costonis identifies a 'just share" principle as the underlying
theoretical foundation for his second element. 82 If the linkage be-
tween purpose and use is found, the loss to the property owner is
simply his "just share" of the costs of living in a civilized society. If
not, the property owner has been unfairly singled out.
One way to understand the value choices inherent in this sec-
ond element is to reconsider the navigation servitude cases by ref-
erence to this element. In the navigation servitude cases, the use-
dependency element is not satisfied. The government's purpose is
to facilitate interstate navigation. The property owner's use has
nothing to do with this purpose; the property owner is singled-out
because his property is located on or adjacent to navigable waters.
Applying the model's second element, a navigation servitude incur-
sion would ordinarily be deemed a taking.
In fact, the Court has shifted back and forth on the navigation
servitude/takings issue, sometimes invoking the hornbook rule that
loss attributable to the imposition of the servitude is not a taking,
other times talking of special factual considerations and finding a
taking in the imposition of the servitude.' 83 In this latter set of
cases the Justices often seem influenced by their sense of the expec-
tations of the property owner. Where the particular facts somehow
supported the owner's expectation of no governmental interfer-
ence, the Court found a taking.' 84 Where no special circumstances
were involved, just the ordinary disappointment of the riparian
owner, the Court has been less likely to find a taking.1
8 5
The navigation servitude cases show that it is possible to de-
182 "Under the just share principle, the taking determination depends upon whether a
linkage exists between the purpose of a measure and the use of the affected property estab-
lishing that the proprietor has not been unfairly singled out to bear losses that should be
distributed among the public generally." Costonis, supra note 6, at 486-87.
183 See note 87 supra.
184 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Monongahela Navigation Co.
v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1892).
185 See, e.g., United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
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cide the takings issue without strict reliance on a use-dependency
principle. The point is not that use-dependency is wrong or irrele-
vant to takings jurisprudence. The Court has invoked use-depen-
dency in some takings cases. 18 6 Nonetheless, the navigation
servitude cases demonstrate that it is possible to construct a takings
jurisprudence which does not rely so absolutely on the idea of use-
dependency. Thus, the construction of the model with its use-de-
pendency element is a value choice.
The third element of Costonis's model asks, "Does this mea-
sure infringe more severely upon the property taken than is re-
quired to achieve its intended goals?"' 187 This element focuses on
the impact of the governmental action, but solely from the govern-
ment's perspective. It seeks to determine whether the government
is using a heavier hand than is needed to accomplish its goals.
Although the third element is a plausible analytic tool, an obvious
alternative can be found in the opinions of some of the twentieth
century takings cases. These cases, like the third element, reflect a
concern for the impact of the government's action. In the Mahon
opinion, Justice Holmes discussed the impact of the challenged
statute in terms of the destruction of the coal company's entire
186 Costonis asserts that the use-dependency test derives from the "clothed with a public
interest" idea of Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). Costonis, supra note 6, at 487 n.93.
In Munn, a state statute fixed the maximum charges for storage fees in grain warehouses.
The warehouse owners challenged the statute under the commerce clause and the four-
teenth amendment. Justice Waite rationalized the constitutionality of the statute by con-
cluding that the public had an interest in the use of the property; the grain warehouses had
become "clothed with a public interest." 94 U.S. at 133-36.
The difficulty with the "clothed with a public interest" idea is in setting its limits, a
point first noted injustice Field's dissent in Munn. Id. at 136-54 (Field, J., dissenting). The
idea reappeared from time to time. See, e.g., Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Rela-
tions, 262 U.S. 522 (1922). Justice Sutherland used the idea as part of an opinion by which
the Court struck down a New York statute which prohibited the resale of theater tickets at
more than a 50 cent premium (Justice Sutherland asserted that theaters were not clothed
with a public interest). See Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927). Justice
Holmes wrote an angry dissent characterizing the idea as a "fiction."
[T]he notion that a business is clothed with a public interest and has been devoted
to the public use is little more than a fiction intended to beautify what is disagreea-
ble to the sufferers. The truth seems to me to be that, subject to compensation
when compensation is due, the legislature may forbid or restrict any business
when it has a sufficient force of public opinion behind it. Lotteries were thought
useful adjuncts of the State a century or so ago; now they are believed to be im-
moral and they have been stopped. Wine has been thought good for man from the
time of the Apostles until recent years. But when public opinion changed it did
not need the Eighteenth Amendment, notwithstanding the Fourteenth, to enable a
State to say that the business should end. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623. What
has happened to lotteries and wine might happen to theatres in some moral storm
of the future, not because theatres were devoted to a public use, but because peo-
ple had come to think that way.
Id. at 446 (Holmes,J., dissenting). The Court has made little use of the label "clothed with
a public interest" in recent times.
187 See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
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property interest. 8 8 In Penn Central, Justice Brennan focused on
the impact of the landmark preservation law on Penn Central's
property holdings. 89 Although both the model and the cases share
an attention to the impact of a governmental incursion, the model
gauges the acceptability of the impact by reference to the govern-
ment's need, while Justices Holmes and Brennan focus on the im-
pact from the property owner's perspective. Costonis's model asks
whether the impact is greater than needed to accomplish the gov-
ernment's end. Justices Holmes and Brennan ask whether the im-
pact is greater than we should expect to be borne by the property
owner.
By choosing to characterize the second and third elements this
way, Costonis makes a choice for certain values and thereby for cer-
tain constituencies. His second and third elements are choices
which tend to favor those property owners who are able to attack
the use-dependency linkage. Property owners whose use or pro-
posed use can be easily and obviously linked to the government's
end are losers.
The fourth element of Costonis's model determines the weight
of the government's burden in overcoming the presumption of a
taking or, in Costonis's alternate characterization, the degree ofju-
dicial scrutiny of the government's decision to proceed without
paying compensation. Costonis analogizes this element and its ef-
fect to the "tiers of review" concept of the equal protection
cases. 190 If the property owner's dominion interest is threatened by
a governmental incursion grounded in a less well-recognized police
power end, the appropriate level ofjudicial review is analogized to
"strict scrutiny." Because strict scrutiny review in the equal protec-
tion setting almost always results in invalidation, 19' a governmental
incursion which posed the "dominion interest versus a less well-
recognized end" conflict would presumably be a taking under the
model. At the other extreme, the combination of a purely financial
interest threatened by a governmental incursion grounded in a
well-recognized and significant police power end triggers the "ra-
tionality review" analog. In the equal protection arena this form of
review almost always results in a validation of the legislation. 1 2
188 [The statute] purports to abolish what is recognized in Pennsylvania as an estate
in land-a very valuable estate-and what is declared by the Court below to be a
contract hitherto binding the plaintiffs .... To make it commercially impractica-
ble to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes
as appropriating or destroying it.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
189 See notes 64-71 supra.
190 See note 25 supra and accompanying text.




Thus, the property owner who can assert only a financial loss re-
sulting from the government's pursuit of a well-established end
presumably will not be entitled to compensation under the model.
The fourth element of the model is a distinct ordering of val-
ues with distinctly different meanings for various sorts of property
owners. While the idea of dominion does seem to be part of our
culture and, thereby, part of legal decisionmaking in the takings
cases, Costonis chooses to elevate this particular feature to a posi-
tion of transcendent importance. 193 To subordinate the financial
interest to the dominion interest is a distinct value choice. More-
over, governmental incursions which trigger the takings issue can
threaten a set of interests, including interests in dignity, commu-
nity, and political participation. 194 To choose dominion as the most
significant interest in each and every takings case is a choice which
begs for some explanation and justification.
In summary, Costonis's "value-neutral" model reflects a dis-
tinct set of value preferences. Dominion comes to center stage.
The property owner with only financial interests at stake has little
hope of compensation, however dramatic the loss from his individ-
ual perspective, and the use-dependency element cuts like an ana-
lytic knife through the takings jurisprudence.
Costonis has offered a model which reflects value choices and
ordering. He makes both the positive and normative claim for the
model, which he calls "a principled, coherent predicate for judicial
management of compensation practice under the takings
clause."' 195 Nonetheless, what little justificatory argument he offers
makes no direct appeal to the particular value preferences ex-
pressed in the model. Instead, he focuses on the coherence prom-
ised by the model and other formal features of his construct.
Costonis argues that his model will provide the sense of coher-
ence now lacking in the Court's ad hoc approach.196 He presumes
that the integrity of the takings decisions and thus the integrity of
193 See Costonis, supra note 6, at 499-500.
194 Although Costonis asserts that the "dominion interest is not monolithic but rests on
a variety of values," he nonetheless chooses the dominion interest from among a set of
alternative interests or combination of interests which can be threatened by a governmental
incursion related to one's property. See Costonis, supra note 6, at 518. It is this choice
which begs justification.
195 See note 12 supra.
196 [L]itigants, professional observers, and society as a whole deserve assurance that
whatever value judgments are ultimately necessary to transform a debate into a
decision proceed from a coherent framework .... The integrity of individual tak-
ings decisions, in short, depends less on the actual outcomes as such than on the
consistent, even-handed application of a coherent decisional approach over time.
As presently constituted, the multifactor balancing test cannot provide this
assurance.
Costonis, supra note 6, at 524.
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the Court depend on the outside world's perception of a commonly
shared, coherent decisional model. Actual outcomes become less
important than appearances.
The justificatory argument which relies on appearances and
not outcomes is consistent with formalism. As long as the Court's
takings decisions appear to flow from a quasi-deductive decisional
process, the integrity of those decisions will be preserved. Costonis
presumes that integrity can be achieved only out of a publicly per-
ceived, quasi-deductive decisional process, thereby ignoring the
possibility that observers of the Court could perceive and accept an
ad hoc approach which focused on the actual outcome rather than
appearances. He also leaps to the idea that the important thing is
to preserve the integrity of decisions, rather than considering the
possibility that decisions might be wrong and in need of attack
rather than preservation. 9
7
Costonis also justifies his model, in particular the fourth ele-
ment, by analogy to the Court's decisions in other constitutional
law areas, such as the first amendment cases, in which the depth of
judicial scrutiny appears to move on a graduated scale depending
on the type of expression in question. t98 Costonis neither defends
the graduated scale in its first amendment context nor explains why
it should be carried over to the takings cases. Rather, he is satisfied
to show that his model will make takings opinions look more like
other sorts of constitutional law cases. The formalist's concern for
tidiness within a given doctrinal compartment can also lead to tidi-
ness and symmetry across doctrinal compartments. We can surely
make the takings opinions look more like the first amendment opin-
ions; the formalist, however, does not tell us why we would wish to
do so.
Costonis concludes the body of his article with a suggestion
that appears to be anything but formalistic:
I believe that each age must address the takings issue anew be-
cause perceptions of use-dependency, like those of the concept
of property itself, are closely bound up with the age's overall
political and social currents. ... I have been careful throughout
this Article to distinguish the instrumental question "How
should courts manage litigation under the takings clause?" from
the ultimate question "What is property?" To run the two ques-
tions together by conditioning a response to the first upon the
definitive resolution of the second assures the unproductive am-
197 Costonis does of course attack one case, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). His attack, however, is based on the weaknesses in the Mar-
shall opinion, and Loretto's inconsistency with the model. Costonis, supra note 6, at 506-22.
He does not independently address the question of why the particular outcome in Loretto,
viewed from the perspective of the actual parties, was wrong.
198 See note 25 supra.
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bivalence and conflict that pervade current takings com-
mentary.1 99
This is, however, the ultimate formalist move. Costonis pretends to
avoid the ultimate question of what is property. He pretends to
speak only of the lesser and separate question of judicial manage-
ment. But the questions cannot be separated. The Court's takings
cases provide an answer to the question of what constitutes prop-
erty. Property is that set of interests which at any given time are
sheltered from the uncompensated-for reach of the majority.200
The protected set of interests is determined by how courts manage
litigation under the takings clause. Thus, the questions cannot be
sensibly separated. Moreover, the ambivalence and conflict that re-
sults when we run these questions together is a reflection of the
ambivalence and conflict in our basic sense of the nature and role
of private property in the latter twentieth century. To pretend that
the questions are separate and that the question ofjudicial manage-
ment is somehow unrelated to the ultimate question is the most
striking example of the formalist's cloak of value-neutrality.
The task remaining is to discern the harm, if any, in the propa-
gation of a formalistic sense of the takings issue. The answer lies in
the ways in which the takings debate may be circumscribed by mod-
eling. The power of modeling is primarily in its formalistic assump-
tions. The assumptions, once accepted, do not dictate particular
answers to particular takings cases, but they do determine the
framework of the debate. For example, a critic who accepts the for-
malistic assumptions might nonetheless subject the Costonis model
to a critique which challenged his positive claim. An analysis of the
recent takings cases might suggest to the critic that the real model
is somewhat different from Costonis's model.201 Yet as soon as the
debate takes this turn, formalism has taken hold. Legal scholarship
concerning takings jurisprudence thereby becomes a process of dis-
covery and not creation. Arguments thereafter center around the
language and decisions from which the model might be discovered,
rather than arguing about the particular ideas and values which
ought to be advanced. We would see theories as either vindicated
or repudiated by reference to their predictive value, rather than by
reference to the values they express. Positivism can become the
prevailing philosophy and hard normative theorizing can slip
away.202
199 Costonis, supra note 6, at 527-28.
200 See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
201 See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
202 Professor Gilmore expressed the point eloquently:
The vice of the formalistic approach to law, on the level of serious scholarship as
on the level of political slogans and advertising campaigns, is that it leads to a
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Even if the modeler engages in the normative quest for the
right model, formalism persists. The insistence on the possibility
and virtue of modeling will be part of the quest. Any justification of
the proffered model is likely to turn on the model's elegance, co-
herence, and other formal features. The model, after all, is merely
a framework for decision. What the modeler likely misses (or inten-
tionally obscures) is the way in which the framework for decision
necessarily brings some things in and shuts some things out,
thereby becoming a value choice.
Whether the modeler is on a positive or normative quest, or
whether the modeler misses or obscures the inevitable value
choices expressed in the model, the essential effects are the same.
Modeling of the takings issue is an intellectual idea which has the
power to affect future takings cases in sure, but unknowable, ways.
The effect is sure in the sense that intellectual history informs us
generally of the power of ideas. More specifically, the ideas ex-
pressed in the academic debate of the latter part of the twentieth
century can become the accepted premises for decisionmaking in
the takings cases of the twenty-first century. If the premises for
decisionmaking are expressed in non-ideological terms, the percep-
tion of the cases will be different than it would be if the premises
were to embrace explicitly the ideological-based choices posed in
the cases. Differing perceptions are likely to lead the deci-
sionmakers in different directions. The effect is uncertain in the
sense that we cannot know now where we will actually go in our
twenty-first century takings jurisprudence and where we might have
gone with a different perception.
Every intellectual offering arises out of the author's substantive
value framework, whether the offering is a model for the takings
issue or a critique of modeling. The essential value choice underly-
ing this article is the assumption that better choices will be made in
the takings cases if we acknowledge the ostensible incoherence in
our takings jurisprudence and see the source of that incoherence in
our continuing struggle to accommodate private property and pub-
disastrous overstatement of the necessary limits of law. In our own history, both
in the late nineteenth century and in our own time, the proponents of the formalis-
tic approach have included the search for theoretical formulas assumed to be of
universal validity and the insistence that all particular instances should be analyzed
and dealt with in the light of the overall theoretical structure. Solutions to
problems are "right" if they conform to, "wrong" if they deviate from, that struc-
ture. The theoretical model itself quickly becomes frozen, so that what was
"right" or "wrong" in 1870 must be equally "right" or "wrong" in 1920; what is
"right" or "wrong" in 1970 will be equally so in the no doubt magical year of
double twenty. The adept of formalism, once he has perfected his model (or bor-
rowed one ready-made from an economist or a sociologist), becomes an advocate
of stability and an enemy of further change.
G. GiLMORE, supra note 173, at 108 (1977).
[Vol. 61:372
TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
lic welfare. When we see that the choices we make are ideological
in nature, we are more likely to reexamine our basic positions and
assumptions. This reexamination may make us less sure and thus
less comfortable, but the choices we make in that reflective yet un-
comfortable posture will be better than decisions made in the sure-
ness and comfort of formalism.
IV. Conclusion
Takings.jurisprudence is untidy and confused. It will probably
remain so, notwithstanding the efforts of modelers and formalists.
So long as the Justices retain the mixed philosophical perspective
which tells them that individual sacrifice is both forbidden and es-
sential, apparent inconsistency and confusion in the case law will
persist. Moreover, the confusion will continue to be compounded
by the fact that the Court is a decisionmaking body of nine autono-
mous human beings who are asked to decide hard cases.
Modeling of the takings issue, while purporting to give us co-
herence, actually conveys the formalistic idea that our solutions can
be found somehow and somewhere apart from the ideological
clash. That place outside the ideological clash does not exist. The
takings cases represent choices for and against particular interests
and people, choices made within the ideological clash of private
property and public welfare. The danger of modeling and formal-
ism is that it may let us pretend that these hard choices are some-
how easier than they really are.
19861
